

# THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

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 BUREAU OF PUBLIC RELATIONS  
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**"... we have pinned our hopes to the banner of the  
United Nations"**

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THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

B U L L E T I N



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# “ . . . we have pinned our hopes to the banner of the United Nations”

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*Address by THE SECRETARY OF STATE*

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W E ARE BEGINNING to realize that the war is over. It is good to have sons, husbands, and fathers home again. It is good to open a newspaper without fear of finding in the casualty lists the name of one near and dear to us.

But this is not wholly a time of celebration and rejoicing. As families in their homes on the farms and in the cities settle back from the dinner table to hear the boys tell of Normandy and Iwo Jima, there is an unspoken question in every mind. The question is what we can do to make certain that there will never be another war.

During the war our goal was clear. Our goal was victory. The problems of industrial and military mobilization, it is true, were problems of the first magnitude. Production bottlenecks often seemed unbreakable, transportation difficulties and manpower shortages insurmountable. On the fighting front the combined land, sea, and air operations were heartbreaking in complexity.

These were hard tasks. Yet we were able to apply a yardstick to each proposal by asking a simple question: “Will it help to win the war?” The common goal of victory served to unite us and to give purpose and direction to our efforts.

Now that we have come into calmer waters, our relief and gratitude are mixed with uncertainty. Our goal now is permanent peace, and surely we seek it even more anxiously than we sought victory.

The difficulty is that the path to permanent peace is not so easy to see and to follow as was the path to victory.

When an issue is presented, we ask, “Will it help to win the peace?” When the answer is slow to come or does not come at all, we grow uneasy and apprehensive.

While we may be in doubt about many things, there are certain basic propositions on which we are clear.

One is that a just and lasting peace is not the inevitable result of victory. Rather, victory has given us the opportunity to build such a peace. And our lives depend upon whether we make the most of this opportunity.

Another thing of which we are certain is that we Americans alone cannot determine whether the world will live in peace or perish in war. Peace depends quite as much upon others as it does upon us. No nation is the complete master of its fate. We are all bound together for better or for worse.

Because we know this, we have pinned our hopes to the banner of the United Nations. And we are not content simply to take our place in that Organization. We realize that, although the dreams of the world are lodged in it, the United Nations will fail unless its members give it life by their confidence and by their determination to make it work in concrete cases and in everyday affairs.

And so I wish to talk to you about the first meetings of the United Nations. What has been said in these meetings has been said as plainly and bluntly as anything I have heard said by responsible statesmen in any private conference.

These first meetings were intended only to establish the various organs of the United Nations. But so pressing were some of the problems presented to the Security Council that they had to be dealt with before there was a chance for the Council to adopt even provisional rules of procedure.

All was not calm and peaceful at the meetings in London. There was effort to use the United Nations to advance selfish national aims. But the clash of national interests and purposes which were

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reflected in the debates in London was very much like the clash of local and special interests which are reflected in our national and state legislatures.

We may deprecate some of these clashes of interest. But when they exist, it is better that they should be publicly revealed. If these conflicts of interest did not appear in the forums of the United Nations, these forums would be detached from reality and in the long run turn out to be purposeless and futile.

A most significant precedent was established when the Security Council finished its discussions of the complaint of the Syrian and Lebanese Governments requesting the withdrawal of French and British troops from their territories.

The Council did not take formal action because of a difference among the permanent members as to the form of the resolution. But no one questioned the general proposition that no state has the right to maintain its troops on the territory of another independent state without its consent, nor the application of this proposition to the pending case.

The particular form of resolution to this general effect which was presented by the United States representative, Mr. Stettinius, was supported by most of the members of the Council. It failed of acceptance, however, because the Soviet Union vetoed it on the ground that it was not definite enough.

But the British and French Governments immediately announced that, notwithstanding the technical veto of the Soviet Union, they would act in accordance with the American resolution as it clearly represented the views of the Council.

This indicates that the mere legal veto by one of the permanent members of the Council does not in fact relieve any state, large or small, of its moral obligation to act in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter.

The United Nations got off to a good start. However, that does not mean it is an assured success. It simply means that the Charter will work if the peoples of the United Nations are determined to make it work. At times our Congress may make serious errors of omission and commission. Such errors are not the fault of the Congress as an institution. They are the fault of its members or of their constituents who fail to measure up to their responsibilities.

So it is with the United Nations. It will succeed

only as we, the peoples of the United Nations, measure up to our responsibilities.

I should be lacking in candor if I said to you that world conditions today are sound or reassuring. All around us there is suspicion and distrust, which in turn breeds suspicion and distrust.

Some suspicions are unfounded and unreasonable. Of some others that cannot be said. That requires frank discussion between great powers of the things that give rise to suspicion. At the Moscow conference there was such frank discussion. It was helpful. But the basis of some suspicions persists and prompts me to make some comments as to our position.

We have joined with our allies in the United Nations to put an end to war. We have covenanted not to use force except in the defense of law as embodied in the purposes and principles of the Charter. We intend to live up to that covenant.

But as a great power and as a permanent member of the Security Council we have a responsibility to use our influence to see that other powers live up to their covenant. And that responsibility we also intend to meet.

Unless the great powers are prepared to act in the defense of law, the United Nations cannot prevent war. We must make it clear in advance that we do intend to act to prevent aggression, making it clear at the same time that we will not use force for any other purpose.

The great powers are given special responsibilities because they have the strength to maintain peace, if they have the will to maintain peace. Their strength in relation to one another is such that no one of them can safely break the peace if the others stand united in defense of the Charter.

The present power relationships of the great states preclude the domination of the world by any one of them. Those power relationships cannot be substantially altered by the unilateral action of any one great state without profoundly disturbing the whole structure of the United Nations.

Therefore, if we are going to do our part to maintain peace in the world we must maintain our power to do so; and we must make it clear that we will stand united with other great states in defense of the Charter.

If we are to be a great power we must act as a great power, not only in order to ensure our own security but in order to preserve the peace of the world.

Much as we desire general disarmament and much as we are prepared to participate in a general reduction of armaments, we cannot be faithful to our obligations to ourselves and to the world if we alone disarm.

While it is not in accord with our traditions to maintain a large professional standing army, we must be able and ready to provide armed contingents that may be required on short notice. We must also have a trained citizenry able and ready to supplement those armed contingents without unnecessarily prolonged training.

That is why in the interest of peace we cannot allow our military establishment to be reduced below the point required to maintain a position commensurate with our responsibilities; and that is why we must have some form of universal military training.

Our power thus maintained cannot and will not be used for aggressive purposes. Our tradition as a peace-loving, law-abiding, democratic people should be an assurance that our force will not be used except in the defense of law. Our armed forces, except as they may be called into action by the Security Council, cannot be employed in war without the consent of the Congress. We need not fear their misuse unless we distrust the representatives of the people.

I am convinced that there is no reason for war between any of the great powers. Their present power relationships and interests are such that none need or should feel insecure in relation to the others, as long as each faithfully observes the purposes and principles of the Charter.

It is not enough for nations to declare they do not want to make war. Hitler said that. In a sense he meant it. He wanted the world to accept the domination of a totalitarian government under his direction. He wanted that without war if possible. He was determined to get it with war if necessary.

To banish war, nations must refrain from doing the things that lead to war.

It has never been the policy of the United States in its internal affairs or in its foreign relations to regard the *status quo* as sacrosanct. The essence of our democracy is our belief in life and growth and in the right of the people to shape and mould their own destiny.

It is not in our tradition to defend the dead

hand of reaction or the tyranny of privilege. We did not fight against the Nazis and Fascists who turned back the clock of civilization in order that we might stop the clock of progress.

Our diplomacy must not be negative and inert. It must be capable of adjustment and development in response to constantly changing circumstances. It must be marked by creative ideas, constructive proposals, practical and forward-looking suggestions.

Though the *status quo* is not sacred and unchangeable, we cannot overlook a unilateral gnawing away at the *status quo*. The Charter forbids aggression, and we cannot allow aggression to be accomplished by coercion or pressure or by subterfuges such as political infiltration.

When adjustments between states, large or small, are called for, we will frankly and fairly consider those adjustments on their merits and in the light of the common interests of all states, large and small, to maintain peace and security in a world based on the unity of all great powers and the dominance of none.

There are undoubtedly vitally important adjustments which will require our consideration. Some of these situations are delicate to deal with. I am convinced, however, that satisfactory solutions can be found if there is a stop to this maneuvering for strategic advantage all over the world and to the use of one adjustment as an entering wedge for further and undisclosed penetrations of power.

We must face the fact that to preserve the United Nations we cannot be indifferent—veto or no veto—to serious controversies between any of the great powers, because such controversies could affect the whole power relationship between all of the great powers.

The United States wishes to maintain friendly relations with all nations and exclusive arrangements with no nation. Naturally there are some problems which concern some nations much more than other nations. That is true in regard to many problems related to inter-American affairs. That is true in regard to the control of Germany and Japan.

In our relations with the other great powers there are many problems which concern two or three of us much more than the others of us. I see no objection to conferences between the big three or the big four or the big five.

Even conferences between ourselves and the So-

viet Union alone, conferences between ourselves and Britain alone, or conferences between ourselves and France or China alone, can all help to further general accord among the great powers and peace with the smaller powers.

But in such conferences, so far as the United States is concerned, we will gang up against no state. We will do nothing to break the world into exclusive blocs or spheres of influence. In this atomic age we will not seek to divide a world which is one and indivisible.

We have openly, gladly, and whole-heartedly welcomed our Soviet Ally as a great power, second to none in the family of the United Nations. We have approved many adjustments in her favor and, in the process, resolved many serious doubts in her favor.

Only an inexcusable tragedy of errors could cause serious conflict between us in the future. Despite the differences in our way of life, our people admire and respect our Allies and wish to continue to be friends and partners in a world of expanding freedom and rising standards of living.

But in the interest of world peace and in the interest of our common and traditional friendship we must make plain that the United States intends to defend the Charter.

Great powers as well as small powers have agreed under the United Nations Charter not to use force or the threat of force except in defense of law and the purposes and principles of the Charter.

We will not and we cannot stand aloof if force or the threat of force is used contrary to the purposes and principles of the Charter.

We have no right to hold our troops in the territories of other sovereign states without their approval and consent freely given.

We must not unduly prolong the making of peace and continue to impose our troops upon small and impoverished states.

No power has a right to help itself to alleged enemy properties in liberated or ex-satellite countries before a reparation settlement has been agreed upon by the Allies. We have not and will not agree to any one power deciding for itself what it will take from these countries.

We must not conduct a war of nerves to achieve strategic ends.

We do not want to stumble and stagger into

situations where no power intends war but no power will be able to avert war.

We must not regard the drawing of attention to situations which might endanger the peace, as an affront to the nation or nations responsible for those situations.

It is quite possible that any nation may in good faith embark on a course of conduct without fully appreciating the effects of its conduct. We must all be willing to review our actions to preserve our common interests in the peace, which are so much more important to all of us than the differences which might divide us.

We must get back to conditions of peace. We must liquidate the terrible legacy which the war has left us. We must return our armies to their homelands. We must eliminate the breeding grounds of suspicion and fear. We must not deceive ourselves or mislead our Allies. To avoid trouble we must not allow situations to develop into incidents from which there is no retreat.

We must live by the Charter. That is the only road to peace.

To live by the Charter requires good-will and understanding on the part of all of us. We who had patience and gave confidence to one another in the most trying days of the war must have patience and give confidence to one another now.

No nation has a monopoly of virtue or of wisdom, and no nation has a right to act as if it had. Friendly nations should act as friendly nations.

Loose talk of the inevitability of war casts doubt on our own loyalty to the Charter and jeopardizes our most cherished freedoms, both at home and abroad.

There are ideological differences in the world. There always have been. But in this world there is room for many people with varying views and many governments with varying systems. None of us can foresee the far-distant future and the ultimate shape of things to come. But we are bound together as part of a common civilization.

As we view the wreckage of the war, we must realize that the urgent tasks of reconstruction, the challenging tasks of creating higher standards of living for our people, should absorb all our constructive energies.

Great states and small states must work together to build a friendlier and happier world. If we fail to work together there can be no peace, no comfort, and little hope for any of us.

## A Look at UNRRA

*Article by DALLAS DORT*

**D**ELEGATES from the United Nations are meeting on the fifteenth of March at Atlantic City to participate in the Fourth Session of the Council of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration. They will discuss problems pertaining to the carrying to a successful conclusion of a vast world-wide program already in the full swing of operations.

Three years ago Atlantic City was the scene of another Council meeting—the first. At that time the clouds of war hung heavily over the world. None knew how long the fighting would last or the extent of the destruction and privation which would occur as a result of the struggle. Everyone realized that human needs in the wake of battle would be on a scale never known before, and it was felt that only through the combined efforts of all the United Nations could such staggering needs be met. The representatives of 44 nations had just signed a document which pledged them all to cooperate in this great undertaking which was the first attempt in history to pool the resources and efforts of many nations to relieve the distress caused by war. Although many of the problems to be faced could not be clearly anticipated, the Conference completed the organization of UNRRA and the establishing of its basic policies and procedures with high confidence that UNRRA's job could successfully be accomplished.

Soon after UNRRA's work got under way, difficulties of all kinds immediately began to appear. It was not known exactly when, where, or to what extent the course of war would create the need for assistance and make it possible to start operations. UNRRA could only draw up plans in the hope that when the time for action should arrive they would be adequate and appropriate to meet the needs which would emerge. The fact that the exact nature and timing of the task was so uncertain frequently made it impossible for UNRRA to obtain competent persons, especially since most such people were engaged in urgent and immedi-

ate war work. Serious criticism was leveled at UNRRA's staff and its operating procedures. Problems of military security and possible interference with military operations delayed action and made it extremely difficult to work out definite and prompt arrangements with the liberating armies for the distribution of relief and rehabilitation supplies in areas still in or near active theaters of war. By far the most serious problem, which soon became apparent, was that the requirements for supplies and ships needed to support a continuing war were so vast that in many cases these resources could not be obtained for UNRRA without interfering with clear military needs.

As these difficulties were gradually overcome and as the way was cleared for operations on a large scale, other problems no less serious developed. These, for the most part, concerned basic policies and programs of operation. Serious differences of opinion were expressed regarding such matters as UNRRA responsibilities in ex-enemy areas and toward displaced persons, relations with the international allocating boards and national supplying agencies, and the proper pattern for distributing UNRRA resources. Delays in procuring supplies were encountered and difficulties arose in presenting proper justification of requirements before allocating bodies and in establishing adequate accounting records and systems. There arose a chorus of criticism, some of it justified, some of it not, based on failure to solve promptly these and other problems.

UNRRA has made great progress in overcoming these difficulties and is now well on the way toward accomplishing the task which it was set up to do. Following the end of hostilities it became possible to add to the staff a number of persons who had filled responsible positions in military and other war activities where their com-

Mr. Dort is Adviser on Relief and Rehabilitation, Department of State.

petence had been thoroughly tested. Arrangements were successfully worked out with military and civilian authorities to permit relief operations in areas which were liberated.

In spite of all these difficulties UNRRA has obtained, both before and after the termination of the war, a vast amount of supplies and of ships to transport them. Up to March 1, 1946 a total of 6,000,000 tons of supplies had been shipped to Europe and the Far East. A very large part of these were items in critical world short supply which, with the support of the supplying governments, were made available to UNRRA despite other urgent claims. Without these supplies which UNRRA has sent mass starvation would have resulted in many nations. UNRRA has provided not only food, but clothing, shelter, transportation, and the initial means of restoring agricultural production and the production by industry of essential relief supplies.

In completing the work of UNRRA three big problems must be solved. One is to obtain the balance of the second contributions recommended by the Council at its third meeting in London in August 1945. The second is to translate UNRRA's financial resources into actual, delivered supplies. The third is to utilize its resources in a way which will be most effective in placing the recipient countries in a position to stand on their own feet economically when UNRRA assistance comes to an end.

All 31 non-invaded UNRRA countries were requested by the Council at the third meeting to make a second contribution equal to one percent of their national incomes. This will amount to a total of \$1,850,000,000. Up to March 1, 1946, 3 countries had made their second contribution in full; 2, including the United States, had made a partial contribution; 2 more had authorized the contribution but had made no actual payments; and 24 had taken no action. UNRRA had actually received \$1,092,600,000 out of the second contributions. It cannot carry on its programs unless the remaining amounts are forthcoming in the very near future.

Financial resources are of no value unless they can be translated into supplies. A year or even six months ago nobody would have imagined that requirements for wheat imports would have risen to a point where available supplies could meet only a little over half of the need for the first six months of this year or even that supplies of meats, fats,

and oils would fall so far short of covering the increased requirements. Crop failures resulting from war and bad weather have occurred in Europe, in the Far East, and recently in India. Difficulties in reconverting from wartime to peacetime production and the tremendous world-wide demands for products which have not been available during the war have resulted in a shortage of many other commodities required by UNRRA. Only extraordinary efforts by the supplying and contributing members of UNRRA to make available the maximum amount of foodstuffs and other commodities can remedy this situation. The seriousness of the problem is fully recognized by the supplying governments. President Truman has pledged full United States cooperation and under his direct leadership a series of measures has been taken to increase United States exports of wheat and other needed items. The United States hopes to ship 6,000,000 tons of wheat in the first half of this year although its pre-war exports for a comparable period amounted to only 500,000 to 1,000,000 tons. Canada has also scheduled maximum exports. Other countries are taking similar actions. Further sacrifices will undoubtedly be required and will be made before the crisis is over.

It is vitally important that the end of UNRRA assistance shall not result in leaving the people of recipient countries and their national economies in such a position that further suffering and economic chaos will follow. UNRRA and the recipient countries together will need to plan its programs and the use of the imported supplies so that they will achieve the maximum results in preparing these countries for economic stability. Agricultural rehabilitation supplies to increase the coming harvests and industrial supplies to permit the production of essential relief goods will need to be imported and effectively used even though this may limit the amount of immediate food, clothing, and shelter which is included in the program. Undoubtedly the devastated countries also will need to exert their utmost efforts to continue the internal measures which they have already taken or have planned to conserve their own resources and stabilize their economies.

Certainly there is reason to believe that a cooperative effort by the UNRRA staff, the supplying countries, and the receiving countries will result in the completion of UNRRA's great task with the high hopes of that first Atlantic City conference fully realized.

# Trial of Far Eastern War Criminals

## SPECIAL PROCLAMATION

### ESTABLISHMENT OF AN INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

[The following documents relating to the International Military Tribunal for the Far East are printed as issued on January 19 in Tokyo by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers.]

WHEREAS, the United States and the Nations allied therewith in opposing the illegal wars of aggression of the Axis Nations, have from time to time made declarations of their intentions that war criminals should be brought to justice;

WHEREAS, the Governments of the Allied Powers at war with Japan on the 26th July 1945 at Potsdam, declared as one of the terms of surrender that stern justice shall be meted out to all war criminals including those who have visited cruelties upon our prisoners;

WHEREAS, by the Instrument of Surrender of Japan executed at Tokyo Bay, Japan, on the 2nd September 1945, the signatories for Japan, by command of and in behalf of the Emperor and the Japanese Government, accepted the terms set forth in such Declaration at Potsdam;

WHEREAS, by such Instrument of Surrender, the authority of the Emperor and the Japanese Government to rule the state of Japan is made subject to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, who is authorized to take such steps as he deems proper to effectuate the terms of surrender;

WHEREAS, the undersigned has been designated by the Allied Powers as Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers to carry into effect the general surrender of the Japanese armed forces;

WHEREAS, the Governments of the United States, Great Britain and Russia at the Moscow Conference, 26th December 1945, having considered the effectuation by Japan of the Terms of Surrender,

render, with the concurrence of China have agreed that the Supreme Commander shall issue all Orders for the implementation of the Terms of Surrender.

NOW, THEREFORE, I, Douglas MacArthur, as Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, by virtue of the authority so conferred upon me, in order to implement the Term of Surrender which requires the meting out of stern justice to war criminals, do order and provide as follows:

ARTICLE 1. There shall be established an International Military Tribunal for the Far East for the trial of those persons charged individually, or as members of organizations, or in both capacities, with offenses which include crimes against peace.

ARTICLE 2. The Constitution, jurisdiction and functions of this Tribunal are those set forth in the Charter of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, approved by me this day.

ARTICLE 3. Nothing in this Order shall prejudice the jurisdiction of any other international, national or occupation court, commission or other tribunal established or to be established in Japan or in any territory of a United Nation with which Japan has been at war, for the trial of war criminals.

Given under my hand at Tokyo, this 19th day of January, 1946.

/s/ Douglas MacArthur

/t/ DOUGLAS MACARTHUR

*General of the Army, United States Army  
Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers*

## CHARTER OF THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

### I.

#### CONSTITUTION OF TRIBUNAL

*Article 1. Tribunal Established.* The International Military Tribunal for the Far East is hereby established for the just and prompt trial and punishment of the major war criminals in the Far

East. The permanent seat of the Tribunal is in Tokyo.

*Article 2. Members.* The Tribunal shall consist of not less than five nor more than nine Members, appointed by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers from the names submitted by the Signatories to the Instrument of Surrender.

*Article 3. Officers and Secretariat.*

(a) *President.* The Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers shall appoint a Member to be President of the Tribunal.

*(b) Secretariat.*

(1) The Secretariat of the Tribunal shall be composed of a General Secretary to be appointed by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers and such assistant secretaries, clerks, interpreters, and other personnel as may be necessary.

(2) The General Secretary shall organize and direct the work of the Secretariat.

(3) The Secretariat shall receive all documents addressed to the Tribunal, maintain the records of the Tribunal, provide necessary clerical services to the Tribunal and its Members, and perform such other duties as may be designated by the Tribunal.

*Article 4. Quorum and Voting.*

(a) *Quorum.* The presence of a majority of all Members shall be necessary to constitute a quorum.

(b) *Voting.* All decisions and judgments of this Tribunal, including convictions and sentences, shall be by a majority vote of those Members of the Tribunal present. In case the votes are evenly divided, the vote of the President shall be decisive.

**II.****JURISDICTION AND GENERAL PROVISIONS**

*Article 5. Jurisdiction Over Persons and Offenses.* The Tribunal shall have the power to try and punish Far Eastern war criminals who as individuals or as members of organizations are charged with offenses which include Crimes against Peace.

The following acts, or any of them, are crimes coming within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal for which there shall be individual responsibility:

(a) *Crimes against Peace:* Namely, the planning, preparation, initiation or waging of a declared or undeclared war of aggression, or a war in violation of international law, treaties, agreements or assurances, or participation in a common plan or conspiracy for the accomplishment of any of the foregoing;

(b) *Conventional War Crimes:* Namely, violations of the laws or customs of war;

(c) *Crimes against Humanity:* Namely, murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, and other inhumane acts committed against any civilian

population, before or during the war, or persecutions on political or racial grounds in execution of or in connection with any crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, whether or not in violation of the domestic law of the country where perpetrated. Leaders, organizers, instigators and accomplices participating in the formulation or execution of a common plan or conspiracy to commit any of the foregoing crimes are responsible for all acts performed by any person in execution of such plan.

*Article 6. Responsibility of Accused.* Neither the official position, at any time, of an accused, nor the fact that an accused acted pursuant to order of his government or of a superior shall, of itself, be sufficient to free such accused from responsibility for any crime with which he is charged, but such circumstances may be considered in mitigation of punishment if the Tribunal determines that justice so requires.

*Article 7. Rules of Procedure.* The Tribunal may draft and amend rules of procedure consistent with the fundamental provisions of this Charter.

*Article 8. Counsel.*

(a) *Chief of Counsel.* The Chief of Counsel designated by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers is responsible for the investigation and prosecution of charges against war criminals within the jurisdiction of this Tribunal, and will render such legal assistance to the Supreme Commander as is appropriate.

(b) *Associate Counsel.* Any United Nation with which Japan has been at war may appoint an Associate Counsel to assist the Chief of Counsel.

**III.****FAIR TRIAL FOR ACCUSED**

*Article 9. Procedure for Fair Trial.* In order to ensure fair trial for the accused, the following procedure shall be followed:

(a) *Indictment.* The indictment shall consist of a plain, concise and adequate statement of each offense charged. Each accused shall be furnished in adequate time for defense a copy of the indictment, including any amendment, and of this Charter, in a language understood by the accused.

(b) *Hearing.* During the trial or any preliminary proceedings the accused shall have the right to give any explanation relevant to the charges made against him.

(c) *Language.* The trial and related proceedings shall be conducted in English and in the language of the accused. Translations of documents and other papers shall be provided as needed and requested.

(d) *Counsel for Accused.* Each accused shall be represented by counsel of his own selection, subject to disapproval of such counsel at any time by the Tribunal. The accused shall file with the General Secretary of the Tribunal the name of his counsel or of counsel whom he desires the Tribunal to appoint. If an accused is not represented by counsel, the Tribunal shall designate counsel for him.

(e) *Evidence for Defense.* An accused shall have the right through himself or through his counsel to present evidence at the trial in support of his defense, and to examine any witness called by the prosecution, subject to such reasonable restrictions as the Tribunal may determine.

(f) *Production of Evidence for the Defense.* An accused may apply in writing to the Tribunal for the production of witnesses or of documents. The application shall state where the witness or document is thought to be located. It shall also state the facts proposed to be proved by the witness or the document and the relevancy of such facts to the defense. If the Tribunal grants the application, the Tribunal shall be given such aid in obtaining production of the evidence as the circumstances require.

*Article 10. Applications and Motions before Trial.* All motions, applications or other requests addressed to the Tribunal prior to the commencement of trial shall be made in writing and filed with the General Secretary of the Tribunal for action by the Tribunal.

#### IV.

#### POWERS OF TRIBUNAL AND CONDUCT OF TRIAL

*Article 11. Powers.* The Tribunal shall have the power

(a) To summon witnesses to the trial, to require them to attend and testify, and to question them,

(b) To interrogate each accused and to permit comment on his refusal to answer any question,

(c) To require the production of documents and other evidentiary material,

(d) To require of each witness an oath, affirma-

tion, or such declaration as is customary in the country of the witness, and to administer oaths,

(e) To appoint officers for the carrying out of any task designated by the Tribunal, including the power to have evidence taken on commission.

*Article 12. Conduct of Trial.* The Tribunal shall

(a) Confine the trial strictly to an expeditious hearing of the issues raised by the charges,

(b) Take strict measures to prevent any action which would cause any unreasonable delay and rule out irrelevant issues and statements of any kind whatsoever,

(c) Provide for the maintenance of order at the trial and deal summarily with any contumacy, imposing appropriate punishment, including exclusion of any accused or his counsel from some or all further proceedings, but without prejudice to the determination of the charges,

(d) Determine the mental and physical capacity of any accused to proceed to trial.

#### Article 13. Evidence.

(a) *Admissibility.* The Tribunal shall not be bound by technical rules of evidence. It shall adopt and apply to the greatest possible extent expeditious and non-technical procedure, and shall admit any evidence which it deems to have probative value. All purported admissions or statements of the accused are admissible.

(b) *Relevance.* The Tribunal may require to be informed of the nature of any evidence before it is offered in order to rule upon the relevance.

(c) *Specific evidence admissible.* In particular, and without limiting in any way the scope of the foregoing general rules, the following evidence may be admitted:

(1) A document, regardless of its security classification and without proof of its issuance or signature, which appears to the Tribunal to have been signed or issued by any officer, department, agency or member of the armed forces of any government.

(2) A report which appears to the Tribunal to have been signed or issued by the International Red Cross or a member thereof, or by a doctor of medicine or any medical service personnel, or by an investigator or intelligence officer, or by any other person who appears to the Tribunal to have personal knowledge of the matters contained in the report.

(3) An affidavit, deposition or other signed statement.

(4) A diary, letter or other document, including sworn or unsworn statements which appear to the Tribunal to contain information relating to the charge.

(5) A copy of a document or other secondary evidence of its contents, if the original is not immediately available.

(d) *Judicial Notice.* The Tribunal shall not require proof of facts of common knowledge, nor of the authenticity of official government documents and reports of any nation or of the proceedings, records and findings of military or other agencies of any of the United Nations.

(e) *Records, Exhibits and Documents.* The transcript of the proceedings, and exhibits and documents submitted to the Tribunal, will be filed with the General Secretary of the Tribunal and will constitute part of the Record.

*Article 14. Place of Trial.* The first trial will be held at Tokyo and any subsequent trials will be held at such places as the Tribunal decides.

*Article 15. Course of Trial Proceedings.* The proceedings at the Trial will take the following course:

(a) The indictment will be read in court unless the reading is waived by all accused.

(b) The Tribunal will ask each accused whether he pleads "guilty" or "not guilty."

(c) The prosecution and each accused may make a concise opening statement.

(d) The prosecution and defense may offer evidence and the admissibility of the same shall be determined by the Tribunal.

(e) The prosecution and counsel for the accused may examine each witness and each accused who gives testimony.

(f) Counsel for the accused may address the Tribunal.

(g) The prosecution may address the Tribunal.

(h) The Tribunal will deliver judgment and pronounce sentence.

## V.

### JUDGMENT AND SENTENCE

*Article 16. Penalty.* The Tribunal shall have the power to impose upon an accused, on conviction, death or such other punishment as shall be determined by it to be just.

*Article 17. Judgment and Review.* The judgment will be announced in open court and will give the reasons on which it is based. The record of the trial will be transmitted directly to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers for his action thereon. A sentence will be carried out in accordance with the order of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, who may at any time reduce or otherwise alter the sentence except to increase its severity.

## Disposition of Manchurian Enterprises

*Statement issued on March 1 by Michael J. McDermott, Special Assistant to the Secretary for Press Relations, in connection with alleged reports regarding the removal by the Soviet Government of so-called "war booty" from Manchuria*

We have no agreement, secret or otherwise, with the Soviet Government or any other government in regard to "war booty" in Manchuria. This Government does not accept any interpretation of "war booty" to include industrial enterprises or the components thereof, such as Japanese industries and equipment in Manchuria. Some time ago we informed the Soviet Government that the

disposition of Japanese external assets, such as the industries in Manchuria, is a matter of common interest and concern to those Allies who bore the major burden in defeating Japan, and that it would be most inappropriate at this time to make any final disposition of Japanese external assets in Manchuria either by removal from Manchuria of such industrial assets as "war booty" or by agreement between the Soviet and the Chinese Governments for the control of those assets. This Government has recently initiated discussions with other governments principally concerned with reparations from Japan with respect to the final disposition of Japanese external assets.

# Excerpt from Basic Postulates and General Themes for German Propaganda Abroad

## No. 20: DIRECTIONS FOR PROPAGANDA TO ENGLAND

(laid down under date of 11-2-42)

### *Ten phases of the catastrophic policy of Churchill:*

1. Churchill was already one of the chief war criminals at the outbreak of the last World War, and his military incompetency was demonstrated then in the British defeat at Gallipoli. In the first World War Britain already lost her position as sole mistress of the seas, and with it her unchallenged domination of the world.

2. Adolf Hitler has always offered German friendship to Britain, and an alliance for the maintenance of the British Empire. Churchill refused this policy and brought on the war against Germany. By his guarantee to Poland Churchill placed the decision as to Britain's entry into the war in the hands of a few Polish adventurers who did not want to give Danzig back to Germany.

3. Churchill declared war on Germany because his friends, the British and American capitalists, Jews, and industrialists, were worried lest the successes of the National Socialist economic and social policies would open the eyes of their peoples as to the true reasons for their poverty. Besides, the ruling classes of Britain and America needed a war for their great arms and munitions industries.

4. What were the results of the Churchillian war policy in Europe?

(a) Militarily: The greatest defeats of British history—Andalsnes, Dunkirk, Greece, Crete;

(b) Politically: Britain lost all her friends on the Continent. Her allies, Norway, Holland, Belgium, France, Yugoslavia, and Greece, and conquered by the German and Italian Armies; and the other friends of Britain went over to the side of the Axis. Today British influence has been entirely thrown out of Europe, and Europe herself is united against Britain.

5. After Churchill lost the European nations as allies through his mistakes, he committed the greatest crime of his life when he allied himself

with Bolshevik Moscow. The German Army, with its allies, Italy, Rumania, Hungary, Slovakia, and the volunteer contingents from Spain, Croatia, Holland, Belgium, Denmark, Norway, and France, as well as the Finnish Army, prevented the invasion of Europe by the Bolsheviks, and threw them back to the gates of Moscow. Thereby over ten million able-bodied Russian men were killed or captured, and enormous quantities of Russian war matériel were seized or destroyed. The German Army still stands after two winters on a strong front from Leningrad to the Sea of Azof. Stalin's winter offensives against the German Army have been shattered. The main reserves of men of the Soviet Union, which had to call up the 18- and 50-year-old classes several months ago, have been used up. Stalin is in no position to replace these losses. But the German Army with its allies, whose losses by contrast have been kept within extraordinarily modest limits during the War, will attack the Soviet forces again and again, and destroy them. Churchill and Eden went to Moscow to promise the delivery of Europe to the Bolsheviks, in exchange for his services in the War and the continuation of his sacrifices of blood. In Britain itself Churchill had to give free rein to the Bolshevik agents in their propaganda directed to the British trade unions. Already Maisky plays in labor circles the role of the future uncrowned king of a Bolshevik Britain.

6. As long ago as the time of Chamberlain, Churchill conspired with Roosevelt against his own Prime Minister, and made himself the tool of Roosevelt in incitement to war against Germany. At the same time Roosevelt prevented England from accepting the peace offer of the Führer after the French debacle, and Churchill was his hench-

*Zusammenstellung der Standardthesen und Richtlinien für die Deutsche Auslandspropaganda (nur für den Dienstgebrauch).*

man in this. Churchill has been driven by his failures into complete subservience to Roosevelt, the principal war criminal. Churchill has worked hand in glove with Rooseveltian Yankee imperialism without any restraint in the hope of later help in munitions. For Roosevelt he declared a war to the death with the Axis. For Roosevelt he offended and enraged the Japanese. For Roosevelt he sent the best British ships, the *Prince of Wales* and *Repulse* to Singapore, and lost them there, whereas Roosevelt has exacted heavy sacrifices from England for his promises of assistance. The acquisition of British naval bases in America by the U. S. A., the occupation of Greenland and Iceland by Roosevelt, the acquisition of British property, capital, and other monies in the U. S. A. were only the first robberies of British possessions and wealth. Roosevelt desires to bring the British Empire bit by bit into American possession and thus to take over Britain's heritage in the world. This has been Roosevelt's plan for a long time, and Churchill, half-American by birth, is his henchman in this.

The landings of American troops in Great Britain are only a means for Roosevelt to keep Britain in subjection. These troops are nothing else but the first American policemen in the British Isles, who will see to it that the Englishman continues the war for America and surrenders the last penny.

7. The war between Britain and Japan is entirely Churchill's fault. Because British policy turned out, through Churchill, to be in complete dependence on the U. S. A., Churchill had to take part willy-nilly in Roosevelt's provocative policy toward Japan. His blank check to Roosevelt permitted the latter, through a policy as insulting as it was stupid, to provoke Japan to war, and was thus an authorization of Japan's attacks against Britain and the United States in East Asia. The defeats in the Pacific and East Asia are thus the direct result of Churchill's lack of foresight. Because of the victory of the Japanese at Pearl Harbor and the sinking of the *Prince of Wales* and the *Repulse*, the domination of the Pacific and Indian Oceans has been lost by Britain and America to the Japanese. The loss of Hong Kong and the Philippines, the agreements of the Japanese with Indochina and Siam made possible the seizure of Malaya, Singapore, Burma, and the Netherlands East Indies. The material losses of the British in the areas seized by the Japanese are

considerably more than a thousand million pounds sterling.

8. The loss of domination of the sea and air, and the territorial losses in the East Asiatic region are exclusively the results of Churchill's war policy. All these British possessions are once and for all irrevocably lost. In addition, the seizure of Burma means the *coup de grâce* for Chiang Kai-shek by the closing of the Burma Road. Through Japanese control of this area, the British Dominion of Australia, as well as the pearl of the British Empire, India, are not only threatened, but are in danger of being finally lost to England. India is the essence of the British Empire, and without India there will be no British Empire.

9. A united Europe under the leadership of the Axis, and Japan with her allies in East Asia stand in two firm compact blocs against Britain and her widely dispersed allies. They form a combination of powers such as, for fighting strength and outstanding strategic position, has never been seen before. This combination is invincible. It forces the British and Americans to scatter their forces over all the oceans. But even before the attack of Japan the British and their followers had lost over 15 million tons (BRT) of shipping space. Submarine warfare has been extended to all the high seas of the world by the attack of Japan. Today tonnage losses have mounted to 30 million tons (BRT). Even the combined Anglo-American fleets cannot stretch out far enough for the preparation of operations extending throughout the world. Thus U-boat warfare must lead to such losses for the British and Americans that no shipbuilding program in the world can make them good. The necessity of carrying on war over tens of thousands of sea miles with an ever-decreasing tonnage means inevitable paralysis for the British tactic of carrying on war by sea.

10. Churchill's war has led directly to the general impoverishment of Britain. Not only the upper and middle classes, but also the British workers are becoming poorer with every day the war lasts. Always in Britain millions are hungry who have become an easy prey to Bolshevik agitation and propaganda because of the agreements with Churchill. Bolshevik agitation can develop all the more freely from interference, because at the head of the Bolshevik envoys in London stands Maisky, to whom Churchill must give free rein for fear of a Soviet withdrawal from the war. While

the German people has had its revolution and has become immune through the new social order of Adolf Hitler to all foreign revolutionary propaganda, the British people still has its revolution ahead of it. Churchill's war is liquidating democracy in Britain. The end result can only be general impoverishment and the triumph of Bolshevism in Britain.

#### Conclusion:

Ever since the beginning of the war Churchill has lost one possession after another. Churchill unleashed the war against Germany and Italy and thereby lost his influence everywhere in Europe. He unleashed the war against Japan and thereby lost his dominating position and all his possessions in East Asia. He staked the heart of the Empire, India. His policy of hate and unreason turned out to be complete dependence on Roosevelt, and he is no longer in a position to grant still further important possessions of the British Empire to the U. S. A. His policy is leading to the Bolshevikization of England. He is a military amateur, a politician without scruples and a Jonah (*Pechvogel*) who bungles everything he touches. The disastrous motto on the escutcheon of his ancestors, "Confident but unlucky," has become true in a sense other than that intended. Churchill is the gravedigger of the British Empire.

#### Complementary Directive for the Handbook of "Instructions for Propaganda directed to Britain by Radio"

(laid down under date of 10-3-42)

1. The peace offers of the Führer should be cited in order to emphasize especially by whom and in what words these offers were refused. The following offers are particularly pertinent:

(a) After the re-occupation of the Rhineland, the Führer brought forth a comprehensive peace plan in a memorandum of 31 March 1936, which proposed among other things:

1. Equal rights for all European states;
2. The creation of a tranquilizing security zone on each side between Germany and the Western Powers;
3. An agreement on aerial matters (*Luftpakt*);
4. A pact for the purification (*Entgiftung*) of public opinion between Germany and France;
5. The conclusion of non-aggression treaties with Czechoslovakia and Poland;

6. The creation of an international court of arbitration and the recommencement of disarmament negotiations as well as the limitation of the use of certain instruments of war.

The answer was the notorious questionnaire (*Fragebogen*) of the British Foreign Secretary Eden of 6 May 1936, which evaded the German proposals in a manner insulting to German policy and made further negotiations impossible.

(b) On September 30, 1938, after the Sudeten crisis, the Führer, together with Neville Chamberlain, signed a Declaration in Munich, in which it was declared that the Anglo-German Naval Agreement was symbolic of the desire of both people never to go to war against each other again and in which it was expressly stated that in the future both countries would settle all differences of opinion which might occur (*alle etwaigen Meinungsverschiedenheiten*) according to the method of consultation. The general British reaction to this agreement was an unheard-of agitation against the Führer and an accelerated rearment of Britain.

(c) In the Führer's speech before the Reichstag of 30 January 1939 he declared that Germany had no territorial demands against England and France. However much a solution of this question would contribute to the pacification of the world, yet there were no problems concerned here which could demand a military solution (*kriegerische Auseinandersetzung*). The British Parliament and Press refused any discussion of the colonial question.

(d) On the eve of the outbreak of the Polish campaign (*Krieg*) the Führer transmitted still another comprehensive offer for a German-British understanding to the British Ambassador on 25 August 1939. In it the Führer declared that he had always been inclined to an Anglo-German understanding. A war between England and Germany could lead under the most favorable circumstances to a victory for Germany, but never for England. He was ready personally to agree to the maintenance (*Bestand*—integrity?) of the British Empire, if the modest German colonial claims would be fulfilled and the obligations *vis-à-vis* Italy remained undisturbed. The answer of Britain was the granting of formal *carte blanche* to Poland, which made a peaceful solution of the German-Polish question impossible.

(e) After the defeat of Poland the Führer made a renewed peace offer in his Reichstag speech of 6

October 1939. He proposed to bring about the settlement by a peace conference of the questions arising out of the partition of Poland and the problem of those international troubles which burden the political and economic life of the nations. The British Prime Minister cynically refused any discussion of the German proposals in a speech before Commons on 12 October 1939.

(f) After the defeat of France the Führer again offered a renewed peace in a speech of 19 July 1940. The Führer declared that he felt himself in duty bound at that time to direct once again an appeal to reason in England. He saw no reason which required the continuation of the war. The British Foreign Secretary Lord Halifax sharply refused the offer of the Führer in a radio speech of 21 July 1940.

By any evaluation of the foregoing points, it is demonstrated again and again that an acceptance of the offers of the Führer would have given a different turn to world history and the present war would not have broken out, or would at length have come to an end.

2. It is to be pointed out over and over again that the Britain of Churchill seized the first excuse for a war, because the Führer wanted to bring the City of Danzig back into the Reich. It is almost inconceivable today that Britain brought on this war because Germany, as the result of a free plebiscite (*Abstimmung*) desired to bring the German City of Danzig back into the Federal Union (*Reichsverband*), and to build a motor highway through the Corridor. Posterity will never understand why Britain gambled the fate of the whole British Empire because of the German-Polish question, which touched her interests in no way.

3. It is to be pointed out over and over again, that Roosevelt is the chief instigator of the war, whom the British have to thank for all their suffering. Roosevelt enticed the British again and again into new actions and caused the war to continue by arousing false hopes in the British. The hopes aroused by Roosevelt have brought England nothing but renewed losses and obligations to carry on the war. America is already inheriting the British military bases on the American coast, economic domination of Canada, and the military control of Australia and New Zealand. And the occupation of Greenland and Iceland, and the incipient occupation of North Ireland and parts

of Africa by Roosevelt are directed against the British interests, because with them the sea routes to North and South America, as well as to South Africa pass under American control. Roosevelt wants to take possession of the British Empire bit by bit, and thus to take over the legacy of Britain. Roosevelt, as a former Naval Secretary, has seen to it that the U. S. A. came into the first World War only after Britain had yielded her claim to domination of the seas. By means of the second World War, which was induced by him, Roosevelt hopes to make the entire British Empire colonies of America.

4. It is to be pointed out over and over again, that this war has brought Roosevelt all the advantages, and the disadvantages and losses to the British. Up to now the British have lost in this War:

(a) Their American bases, their East Asiatic bases, Singapore, Malaya and Burma. England's ally Holland lost Sumatra, Borneo, Celebes and Java, all her East Asiatic possessions.

(b) Parity of fleets with the United States. In spite of the heavy blows it suffered at Pearl Harbor, near Java, in the Solomon Islands and the Coral Sea, the American Fleet is already now significantly stronger than the British Fleet as a result of the enormous British losses. As a result of the continuation of the War, the British Fleet must necessarily sink to second rank as compared with the American Fleet.

(c) Economically, the British have lost all their investments and capital in America. Their valuable possessions, in Southeastern Asia to the tune of over a billion pound sterling have been lost to them as a result of American reprehensible actions toward the Japanese. Further, they have already lost the bulk of their markets in South America, Africa, and India to American exporters.

(d) Because of her loss of revenues from the rubber and tin enterprises, Britain loses 300 million dollars in foreign exchange income, which formerly eased for Britain the balance of payments with America. By this loss Britain is definitely sinking into American finance-slavery.

These processes are only continuing what was already happening in the last War. Exactly as in the World War, it can be stated that the British are paying for the War again, while the Americans are profiting by it.

5. The uselessness for England of continuing this war is to be pointed out. Britain has not become equal in any way to the combination of Powers joined in the Tri-partite Pact. She is separated from her Allies, America and Soviet Russia, by oceans, oceans which she cannot bridge with her ever dwindling fleet, due to sinkings by German, Italian and Japanese submarines. While her ally, Soviet Russia, stands on the brink of annihilation, Japan has gathered in her East Asiatic possessions and brought others under her control. After the seizure of Burma and Java, Japan threatens India by land and sea, and therewith the rearward routes to Egypt, and can now proceed to the seizure of India, Australia and New Zealand; and Britain can offer no resistance to this in the long run. Chiang Kai-shek has been cut off from supplies of Anglo-American war materials by the closing of the Burma Road. The Stilwell Road (*lit. trans.* Assam Road) does not exist. American assistance in the Pacific has proved itself ineffective. Thus Britain, cut off from her most valuable possessions, is proceeding to inevitable defeat. The continuation of the war serves the purpose only of the Americans, who by endangering the British Empire ever further, gain more opportunities to take over the crumbling pieces of the British Empire, while Britain sinks into complete dependence on the United States because of her impoverishment. Thus the position of Britain is already so grave that it is becoming more hopeless with every day the war drags on.

6. The danger to England which the alliance with the Bolsheviks entails should always be pointed out. It should always be repeated that the Bolshevik system is the mortal enemy of the British way of life, and that the entrance of Bolshevism into the British Empire entails the insurrection of colonial peoples and therewith the final destruction of the world-wide Empire. Suspicion of Bolshevism by examples from Bolshevik life should be aroused and heightened. The British wife should be made to realize that in the Bolshevik system there is no marriage in the Central European sense; the pious Englishman should be made to realize that in the Soviet system belief in God is punished with death and that in truth religious tolerance is not practiced in the Soviet system. One should indicate the particular dangers which grow out of the activities of the "parlor pink"

(*Salonbolschewisten*) Cripps and Maisky, the Soviet Ambassador in London. And in this relationship one should point to Lenin's will, which indicated the abolition of the British Empire as the holiest duty of every Bolshevik.

7. One should watch most carefully to make sure that always only undeniable facts should be used in the propaganda. Further, one should avoid demanding of the individual Englishman deeds and actions which go against his patriotic feelings. Historical parallels with the World War and its consequences for the British are especially (*bevorzugt*) to be employed.

## Crime Against the Jews Under Hitler

### STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT

In the trial of war criminals at Nürnberg the fact has been established that 5,700,000 Jews perished under the murderous reign of Hitlerism. That crime will be answered in justice.

There are left in Europe 1,500,000 Jews—men, women, and children—whom the ordeal has left homeless, hungry, sick, and without assistance. These, too, are victims of the crime for which retribution will be visited upon the guilty. But neither the dictates of justice nor that love of our fellow man which we are bidden to practice will be satisfied until the needs of these sufferers are met.

## Appointment of Major General Hilldring as Assistant Secretary of State

The White House announced on February 27 the appointment of Maj. Gen. John H. Hilldring as Assistant Secretary of State. It was said that no legislation will be needed for the General to retain his status because he will soon retire from the Army.

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The statement by the president was released to the press by the White House on Feb. 25, the announcement of the appointment of Major General Hilldring on Feb. 27.

# Far Eastern Commission

## SUMMARY REPORT ON TRIP TO JAPAN

### ENCLOSURE "A": ITINERARY

#### I. General Statement

1. The Far Eastern Commission left Washington on the evening of 26 December 1945, in two special C-54 planes furnished by the Air Transport Command. After a brief stop-over at Hamilton Field, California, the Commission arrived at Hickham Field the evening of December 28, 1945, where it was received by General Lawton, Acting Chief of Staff for Rear Admiral M. F. Schoeffel, representing Admiral Spruance, CINCPAC, General Richardson, Commanding General MidPac, and the members of General Richardson's staff.

The Commission embarked the evening of the same day on the U. S. S. *Mt. McKinley*, Commanding Officer Captain Wayne Gamet, and sailed for Japan from Pearl Harbor at 0700 the morning of December 29.

2. After 10 days en route, the Commission arrived at Yokohama at noon on Wednesday, January 9, 1946, where it was met by Major Gen. W. F. Marquat on behalf of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers. After discharging oil in order to adjust trim, the ship proceeded over the bar the following morning and tied up alongside the dock at Shiba-Ura, Tokyo.

3. During the 23 days of its stay in Japan the Commission lived aboard ship and used as headquarters ashore special offices which had been arranged for it in the Dai Ichi building, where GHQ was housed.

4. The Chief Delegates had an initial luncheon and meeting with General MacArthur on Thursday, January 10, a second meeting with General MacArthur in his offices on Tuesday, January 29, and invited him and Mrs. MacArthur for lunch on board the ship on Wednesday, January 30.

5. The bulk of the Commission's activities in Japan consisted of conferences with various sec-

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Memorandum for Information No. 22, dated Feb. 25. Enclosure "C" of press releases, Enclosure "D" of bibliography, and Enclosure "E" of personnel not printed herein. For roster of Commission personnel on trip to Japan see BULLETIN of Dec. 30, 1945, p. 1055.

tions of the Supreme Commander's General Headquarters. In addition, there were several trips made to various sections of Japan when opportunity was given to inspect local conditions and to confer with local military authorities as well as local Japanese officials.

6. At the conclusion of a special meeting with the Commission on the subject of Hokkaido, Lt. Col. Spillers, Chief, Forestry Division, Natural Resources Section, SCAP, presented the Commission with a carved basswood bear from Hokkaido. The carving had been made by the Ainu, aborigines of the island, and has become the centerpiece for the Commission's conference table, as a memento of its visit to Japan.

7. The Commission acquired a great many documents in the course of its meetings with the staff sections of SCAP, and these are listed in enclosure "C". These were distributed to the Commission while in Japan, if received in sufficient quantity, or are on file in the secretariat, in case of items of which only one copy was received.

8. The Commission made a final visit to the Eighth Army Headquarters in Yokohama and to the Naval Command in Yokosuka on Thursday, January 31, prior to embarking on the *Mt. McKinley* the evening of that day. The *Mt. McKinley* sailed from Yokosuka at 0700 on February 1 for Pearl Harbor.

9. After 11 days at sea, the Commission arrived at Pearl Harbor the morning of February 11 and left for San Francisco and Washington from Hickham Field the evening of February 11. The Commission arrived in Washington the morning of February 13.

[Here follows "II. Detailed Itinerary"]

### ENCLOSURE "B": SELECTED COMMUNICATIONS

#### I. General Exchanges Between the Commission and General MacArthur

*1 January 1946*

General of the Army DOUGLAS MACARTHUR  
Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers  
Supreme Headquarters

New Year's greetings to you from the Far Eastern Commission enroute Japan, with wishes for continued success in the difficult task of occupation and administration which you have conducted so admirably and for which the United Nations, particularly those in the Far East, will be forever deeply indebted.

For the Far Eastern Commission

NELSON T. JOHNSON

*Secretary General*

3 January 1946

Pass to Secretary General Nelson T. Johnson. Many thanks to the Commission for its cordial message. I am looking forward with anticipation to its arrival in Tokyo.

MACARTHUR

4 January 1946

General of the Army MACARTHUR

*Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers  
Supreme Headquarters, Tokyo*

From McCoy, Chairman, FEC

1. Believing it would be helpful to you and your staff in meeting the desires of the Commission for information relating to its work, the Commission forwards herewith the following list of subjects which have been allocated to committees of the Commission for study and on which it would appreciate information as soon as practical upon arrival.

- (a) Social and Economic Problems
- (b) Constitutional Reform
- (c) War Criminals
- (d) Aliens in Japan
- (e) Strengthening of Democratic Processes

2. With reference to category *a* above, Social and Economic Problems, the Commission would especially appreciate detailed information (which is no doubt already available or in preparation) on the following:

- (a) Agriculture and Other Forms of Primary Production
- (b) Industrial Capacity, Organization, and Production
- (c) Financial Structure, Japanese Assets, and Statistical Position of Japanese Banks
- (d) Labor Conditions.
- (e) Communications and Transportation
- (f) Shipbuilding
- (g) Present Status of Interest, Assets, and

Rights of All United Nations and Their Nationals in Japan

3. For your information and as an appendix to this message, the Commission is forwarding its tentative long-term agenda, which will indicate in a comprehensive way the scope of its interest.

**Appendix: (Tentative) Long-Term Agenda for the Commission FEAC-10/2, November 9, 1945**

1. Basic Policies and Objectives in regard to Japan

2. Social and Economic Problems

(a) Extent and character of Japanese industry, commerce and agriculture necessary for a viable economy in Japan

(b) Measures necessary to establish such an economy

(1) Regulation of Japanese foreign commerce

(2) Control of agriculture

(3) Control of fishing and aquatic industries

(4) Control of transportation and communication

(5) Control of industry

(c) Adjustment of system of land tenure

(d) Ownership and Japanese industry, finance, and commerce

3. Reduction and Control of Japanese War Industry

(a) Armament production

(b) Heavy industry

(c) Aeronautical industry

(d) Merchant shipping

(e) Shipbuilding

(f) Reconversion of other wartime industry to peacetime purposes

(g) Long-range control of rearmament

(h) Control of scientific and industrial research

4. Restitution and Reparation

(a) Seizure and disposition of Japanese overseas property and investments

(b) Reparations: goods and materials, merchant ships, factory installations, Japanese patents and scientific processes

(c) Use of Japanese labour by Allies

(d) Measures necessary to safeguard the interests of the United Nations and foreign assets in Japan

(e) Restitution of looted property, including objects of historical, cultural, and artistic value

5. Constitutional Reform

(a) Emperor

- (b) Diet
- (c) Cabinet
- (d) Local government
- (e) Political parties
- (f) Civil liberties
- (g) Machinery for drafting new constitution

6. War Criminals

7. Aliens in Japan

- (a) Enemy nationals other than Japanese
- (b) Koreans
- (c) Allied persons desiring repatriation
- (d) Allied persons who have collaborated with the Japanese
- (e) Neutral nations
- (f) Relation of non-Japanese civilians to Japanese authorities

8. Strengthening of Democratic Processes

- (a) Positive policy in the reorientation of the Japanese
- (b) Educational system
- (c) Control of public information—the press and radio
- (d) Workers' and peasants' organizations
- (e) Civil liberties
- (f) Purging of militarist and totalitarian elements
- (g) Dissolution of secret and other undesirable societies
- (h) Reform of police system
- (i) Improving the status and role of women
- (j) State Shinto

9. Disarmament and Demobilization

- (a) Processes of disarming and demobilizing
- (b) Disposal of arms
- (c) Policing and inspection of disarming
- (d) Disposal of Japanese fleet
- (e) Disposal of Japanese aircraft, air fields, etc.
- (f) Employment of discharged Japanese servicemen
- (g) Treatment of Japanese ex-officers

10. Relief Problems in Japan

- (a) Prevention of mass unemployment
- (b) Public health
- (c) Food
- (d) Housing
- (e) Repatriation of Japanese from overseas territories

11. Financial Problems

12. Organization of Allied Control and Military Government in Japan

13. Conditions under which Japan may be ad-

mitted to membership in the United Nations Organization

**14. Other Matters Raised by Member Governments**

*7 January 1946*

For General FRANK McCoy

Major General William F. Marquat will meet you on arrival in Yokohama with a tentative agenda and program which can be modified as may be desired. Every facility will be given to individual members to make such informal contacts with the Japanese as they wish and all side trips that you may have in mind can be readily arranged. I am sure that you have no concern as to the entire purpose of this Headquarters will be to facilitate the work of the Commission. All data that we have is of course available to you and I believe it will be quite adequate for your purpose. I would like to have the 10 members of the Commission, Mrs. McCoy and Secretary Johnson take their first meal ashore with me and have asked Marquat to arrange the matter with you. It is hardly necessary to add my warmest welcome to you all.

MACARTHUR

*1 February 1946*

General of the Army DOUGLAS MACARTHUR  
*Supreme Allied Commander*  
*Tokyo, Japan*

On its departure from Japan the Far Eastern Commission sends you its good wishes for the future and its thanks for all that you and the forces under your command have done to make its visit so profitable.

FRANK McCoy  
*Chairman*

*3 February 1946*

Message for GENERAL McCoy

Thanks for your message. May you all have a safe and pleasant journey home.

MACARTHUR

**II. Exchanges Between the Commission and the Washington Office Regarding Soviet Participation on the Commission**

*5 January 1946*

1. The Commission received the Terms of Reference of the new Far Eastern Commission which

had been agreed at the meeting of the Foreign Ministers held at Moscow. A meeting was held and the following agreed message was sent to the Commission's office in Washington:

"You may inform the Soviet Embassy that the Chairman and members of the Far Eastern Advisory Commission would welcome participation by the Soviet representative appointed to the Far Eastern Commission and his assistance in the studies and the work of the Far Eastern Advisory Commission pending the organization of the Far Eastern Commission."

2. A few days later, advice was received from Washington that the United States had sent the following message to all governments concerned with the Far Eastern Commission:

"It is the view of this Government that the Far Eastern Commission succeeded the Far Eastern Advisory Commission on 27 December, the date of the Moscow Communiqué, and that there is no need to implement this succession by formal dissolution, inauguration or other formalities."

This position was based on the desire to free the Commission from confusing and burdensome procedural detail.

3. As a consequence of the message quoted in paragraph 2 above, the message to the Soviet Government as proposed by the Commission in paragraph 1 above was altered to read as follows:

" . . . and the work of the Far Eastern Advisory Commission, pending the organization of the Far Eastern Commission pending their return to the United States."

4. On January 23, advice was received from Washington that the following response had been received from the Soviet Government:

"The Soviet Government considers that it is time to proceed to the realization of the decision of the Moscow Conference of the three foreign Ministers on the establishment of a Far Eastern Commission and, for its part, also believes it expedient in the interests of matters at hand to keep to a minimum the procedural details connected with this.

"At the same time the Soviet Government believes it necessary to draw to the attention of the Government of the United States that in the decision of the conference of the three foreign min-

isters it is stated that the Far Eastern Commission being formed will replace the Far Eastern Advisory Commission and that the Government of the United States, on behalf of the four powers, should present the terms of reference to the other governments specified in Article I and invite them to participate in the Commission on the revised basis. Thus it does not follow from the decision of the conference of the three Ministers that the Far Eastern Commission with its former committees, rules, etc., will be automatically transformed into the Far Eastern Commission.

"The Soviet Government assumes that as soon as the members of the Far Eastern Advisory Commission return from Japan to Washington, the Government of the United States will take measures to convene an organization session of the Far Eastern Commission so that the latter may without delay begin to function on the basis of the decision of the three Ministers. (This portion was garbled and is now being serviced.) The U. S. Government has referred the Soviet view to the British and Chinese Governments, stating further 'That this Government desires to cooperate in expediting full functioning of the Commission and that it is willing to follow any reasonable procedure agreeable to its allies.'"

NELSON T. JOHNSON  
*Secretary General.*

### III. Exchange Between the Commission and General MacArthur Regarding Allied Participation in SCAP

7 February 1946  
General MACARTHUR  
*Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers*  
*Supreme Headquarters*  
*Tokyo, Japan*

From McCoy

During the Commission's recent visit to Japan we noted that you would welcome the collaboration of allied experts and advisors in the several fields of activity of your services in your capacity of SCAP. After consideration of this matter by the delegations, it has been suggested that before proceeding further with it, members of the Commission would be grateful for your views and advice on the following questions as to what would be the status of such allied personnel:

1. Should they be integrated in SCAP or employed as advisors?

2. In the latter case would they be as we suppose subject to existing organization of command and discipline?

3. What would be the conditions of their engagement? Nature and duration of contract? Scale of remuneration and by whom payable? Food and lodging? Possibility of bringing families?

4. What sections are wanting experts and on what subject?

5. How and where should application be made?

*8 February 1946*

For General FRANK McCoy

1. They should be integrated into SCAP sections in contradistinction to employment as advisors. Latter not desired and would serve no useful purpose.

2. If in civilian status conditions of engagement nature and duration of contract should be comparable to that of American employees except that salary basis would be determined by government concerned. Present length of American contract is one year. If in military status length of assignment should conform to policy of government concerned.

3. Scale of remuneration and payment to be by the government concerned.

4. Food and lodging to be supplied by mission or comparable agency in Tokyo of government concerned. The same privileges would be extended dependents as contemplated for American employees chief factors being availability of quarters.

5. Practically all sections and subjects could utilize experts. Applications should be submitted as determined by governments concerned for reference to this headquarters.

MACARTHUR

#### IV. Exchange Between the Commission and General MacArthur Regarding Axis Nationals in Japan

*7 February 1946*

General MACARTHUR

*Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers*

*Supreme Headquarters*

*Tokyo, Japan*

From General McCoy

Towards the end of the Commission's stay in Japan, it came to the notice of several of its members that some 2500 Axis nationals, chiefly Ger-

mans, are still enjoying a standard of living much superior to that of many Allied nationals remaining in Japan and are said to be still exercising an influence hostile to Allied purposes. The Commission lacked time to enquire as to what action had been taken or contemplated in regard to these people. It would therefore be helpful if the Commission could be advised on this subject. The foregoing naturally does not apply to persons formerly exposed to political racial persecution.

*18 February 1946*

Prior to the occupation the German Economic Mission here purchased with German government funds food stores which temporarily placed Axis nationals in more favorable position than other foreign nationals. However, upon discovery, action was immediately initiated to correct this situation. German government and Nazi funds have been impounded and all German private property is blocked, subject to living expense allowance of ¥1500 per month for head of family and ¥500 for each dependent. Such restrictions on Axis nationals do not apply to any other foreign nationals residing in Japan. No indication that they are exercising influence inimical to Allied purposes. These nationals have been classified as to political affiliations. Party leaders and certain diplomats have been incarcerated and remainder restricted to certain areas or prefectures under Japanese police custody and American Counter Intelligence Corps surveillance. Further instructions have recently been requested from Washington concerning treatment of German property. Negotiations are in progress with Office Military Government for Germany (United States) with concurrence of War Department for the early repatriation of these nationals. There is no basis for concern by the Commission.

#### Appointment of Randolph Paul as Special Assistant to the President

The White House announced on February 27 the appointment of Randolph Paul to be Special Assistant to the President to conduct negotiations for the Department of State with various European neutrals on the subject of external German assets.

## *International Organizations and Conferences*

### Calendar of Meetings

Council of Foreign Ministers: Meeting of Deputies	London	January 18 (continuing in session)
Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry	Germany and Austria	February 15 (continuing in session)
Far Eastern Commission	Washington	February 26 (continuing in session)
West Indian Conference	St. Thomas, Virgin Islands (U. S.)	February 21 (continuing in session)
North American Regional Broadcasting Engineering Conference	Washington	February 4-25
Extraordinary Meeting of the Directors of the International Meteorological Services (IMO)	London	February 25-March 2
Regional Air Navigation Conference	Dublin	March 4
International Monetary Fund and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development: Boards of Governors	Wilmington Island, Ga.	March 8
Fourth Session of the UNRRA Council	Atlantic City	March 15
Preliminary Meeting of Conference on International Health Organization	Paris	March 15
Ninth International Conference on Education	Geneva	March 4
The United Nations:		
Security Council—Committee of Experts	London	March 15
Refugee Committee	London	March 31

### Activities and Developments

**The Far Eastern Commission** held its first meeting in Washington at 2516 Massachusetts Avenue on February 26 at 10:30 a.m. The Secretary of State welcomed the Commission, the following representatives of which were present:

Maj. Gen. Frank R. McCoy, *Chairman* (U.S.)  
 Sir Frederic Eggleston (Australia)  
 E. Herbert Norman (Canada)  
 Dr. Wei Tao-ming (China)  
 Paul Emile Naggiar (France)  
 Sir Girja Shankar Bajpai (India)  
 Dr. A. Loudon (Netherlands)

Sir Carl Berendsen (New Zealand)  
 Brig. Gen. Carlos Romulo (Philippines)  
 Sir George Sansom (U.K.)  
 Nikolai V. Novikov (U.S.S.R.)  
 Nelson T. Johnson, *Secretary-General*

The temporary Secretary-General read the following memorandum from the United States Department of State, addressed to the United States Representative on the Commission:

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The dates in the calendar are as of Mar. 3.  
 For the Secretary's address of welcome to the Far Eastern Commission and for an article on UNRRA see pages 378 and 359 respectively of this issue.

The Foreign Ministers of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom, and the United States of America at their meeting in Moscow in December 1945, with the concurrence of the Government of China, agreed to establish a Far Eastern Commission, to function under the Terms of Reference appended hereto.<sup>1</sup> It was also agreed that the Government of the United States on behalf of the four Powers should present the Terms of Reference to the Governments of France, the Netherlands, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, India, and the Philippine Commonwealth and invite them to participate in the Commission.

In accordance with this agreement the Government of the United States on December 28, 1945 invited the Governments named above to participate in the Far Eastern Commission on the basis of the Terms of Reference agreed upon at the conference. All the governments accepted the invitation. The French Government, however, based its acceptance on its interpretation that the phrase "other matters" in paragraph II-A-3 of the Terms of Reference referred to matters relative to the control of Japan and stated that if the provisions of this paragraph should be invoked in order to extend the jurisdiction of the Commission to any matter which might bring directly into question French interests in the Far East, the French Government would consider itself justified in claiming, so far as the voting procedure provided for in paragraph V-2 is concerned, a status identical with that enjoyed by the other powers in the Pacific which are permanent members of the Security Council of the United Nations Organization. The United States Government has informed the French Government that it understands "other matters" as used in paragraph II-A-3 of the Terms of Reference to apply to matters relating to control of Japan and that it is not the intention of the United States Government to introduce into the Commission's deliberations matters affecting Southeast Asia, including Indochina, which are not related to the control of Japan. It is assumed that the other participating governments will put on record with the Commission any observations they may desire to make regarding the French position.

<sup>1</sup> BULLETIN of Dec. 30, 1945, p. 1028.

<sup>2</sup> Released to the press on Jan. 25.

All the nations comprising the Far Eastern Commission having agreed to participate in the work of the Commission on the basis indicated, the Secretary of State has informed the participating powers, through their diplomatic representatives in Washington, that the initial meeting of the Commission is to be held in Washington at 10:30 a. m. February 26, 1946, at 2516 Massachusetts Avenue, NW.

JOHN CARTER VINCENT

[Here follows Terms of Reference of the Far Eastern Commission as printed in the BULLETIN of December 30, 1945, p. 1028.]

Maj. Gen. Frank R. McCoy was unanimously elected permanent Chairman, having held the same office on the Far Eastern Advisory Commission, and Nelson T. Johnson was unanimously elected Secretary-General. The organization of the Secretariat and the organization of the Commission's work were discussed. A Steering Committee, made up of the following members, was scheduled to hold its first meeting on February 27:

Australia	New Zealand
Sir Frederic Eggleston	Col. G. R. Powles
Maj. J. Plimsoll ( <i>alternate</i> )	Philippines
Canada	Brig. Gen. Carlos Romulo
E. Herbert Norman	Tomas Confesor ( <i>alternate</i> )
R. E. Collins ( <i>alternate</i> )	U.S.S.R.
China	Nikolai V. Novikov
Dr. Liu Shih-shun	United Kingdom
France	Sir George Sansom
Francis Lacoste	H. A. Graves ( <i>alternate</i> )
India	United States
Sir Girja Shankar Bajpai	George H. Blakeslee
Netherlands	
A. Loudon	
A. D. A. de Kat Angelino ( <i>alternate</i> )	

Questions of immediate importance to be studied by this Committee will be the composition of a tribunal to be set up for the trial of Japanese war criminals, and reparations. The meeting adjourned at 11:40 a.m.

Second North American Regional Broadcasting Engineering Conference<sup>1</sup> which convened in Washington on February 4, 1946 concluded its sessions with the signing on February 25, 1946 of an interim agreement participated in by Canada, Cuba, the Dominican Republic, His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom in respect of

the Bahama Islands, His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom and the Government of Newfoundland in respect of Newfoundland, the United Mexican States, and the United States of America.<sup>1</sup> The Conference was necessitated by the expiration on March 28, 1946 of the North American Regional Broadcasting Agreement which was signed at Habana on December 13, 1937, and by the insistence of Cuba upon additional facilities for broadcasting purposes. The Conference devoted its entire attention to standard-band broadcasting.

Inasmuch as it was generally believed that the complexity of the problem would not permit of the negotiation of a new North American Regional Convention at this time, an interim agreement was signed which continues for a period of three years the application of the terms of the existing North American Regional Broadcasting Agreement, subject to certain modifications and specified additions. Thus the desirable engineering standards of the former convention are largely continued during the succeeding three years. Furthermore, the signing of the interim agreement will prevent the chaos which would result from unregulated standard-band broadcasting after March 28, 1946 which might easily have resulted in a serious radio war.

Having in mind the complexity of the problem, a schedule of procedure was established to co-ordinate preparations for the Third North American Regional Broadcasting Conference which is to be convened in Canada about September 15, 1947. There has been established an engineering committee composed of engineers of Canada, Cuba, Mexico, and the United States which will permit the members thereof to visit and test the transmissions of new stations in the various countries of the North American region as well as existing stations which may be causing interference. It is believed that this committee will go far to reduce the interference which has caused so much difficulty in the past in the standard-broadcast band.

It appears that none of the United States local broadcasting stations will be affected by this

<sup>1</sup> For address by Francis de Wolfe before the closing session of the Second North American Regional Broadcasting Conference, see p. 379.

<sup>2</sup> Released to the press on Feb. 26.

agreement, that the regional United States stations will be in a better position than heretofore and that, of the 25 clear-channel stations in the United States, five have been affected by the permission granted Cuba to operate Class 2 stations in Cuba on those channels. In order to counteract any adverse effect of these concessions, a provision is made in the interim agreement whereby the governments concerned will cooperate with a view to minimizing interference as occasion requires.

**Aviation Agreements: China, Canada, and Dominican Republic.**<sup>2</sup> The Ambassador of China deposited with the Department of State on February 20 the Chinese instrument of ratification of the Convention on International Civil Aviation.

When the International Air Transport Agreement was accepted by China on June 6, 1945 the following reservation was made:

"The acceptances are given with the understanding that the provisions of Article IV Section 3 of the International Air Transport Agreement shall become operative in so far as the Government of China is concerned at such time as the Convention on International Civil Aviation, signed at the International Civil Aviation Conference, shall be ratified by the Government of China."

With the deposit of the Chinese instrument of ratification of the Convention, the provisions of Article IV, Section 3, of the transport agreement therefore become operative with respect to the Government of China.

Other action taken recently on the Interim Agreement on International Civil Aviation, the Convention on International Civil Aviation, and the International Air Transport Agreement concluded at the International Civil Aviation Conference in Chicago on December 7, 1944 includes the following:

The deposit by the Ambassador of the Dominican Republic with the Department of State on January 25 of the instrument of ratification of the Convention by the Government of the Dominican Republic and the acceptance of the interim and transport agreements by that Government; and

The deposit by the Ambassador of Canada with the Department of State on February 13 of the Canadian instrument of ratification of the Convention.

## *Record of the Week*

### **Meeting of Far Eastern Commission**

#### **ADDRESS OF WELCOME BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE**

[Released to the press February 26]

It is a pleasure for me to be here today and to extend a cordial welcome to you who have been designated by your governments to serve on the Far Eastern Commission.

The agreement reached at Moscow for the establishment of this policy-making group to take the place of the Far Eastern Advisory Commission was one of the major accomplishments of that meeting. The Moscow agreement laid the foundation on which all the Allies involved in the Pacific war could unite for the control of Japan. Therefore, the convening of this Commission, comprised of representatives of Great Britain, the Soviet Union, China, France, the United States, the Netherlands, Australia, New Zealand, Canada, India, and the Philippines is a source of genuine gratification. Even though the task of crushing the Japanese end of the Axis fell largely upon the United States, this Government always desired that the control of Japan should become an Allied responsibility. The same unity of action and of purpose that won the war must be maintained if we are to root out the seeds of possible future wars, wherever they may be planted.

Peace in the Pacific is an essential cornerstone to a stable world structure. The guidance of Japan to a position of peaceful association with other nations is therefore a task of major responsibility. That responsibility now belongs to you of the Far Eastern Commission.

As the meeting of this new Commission opens a new phase in the control of Japan, I should like to commend to you the progress thus far made. The directives issued and the administration established by the Supreme Allied Commander represent sound and significant contributions to the

transformation of Japan. While we can, I believe, view our accomplishments to date with considerable satisfaction, we should not for a moment lose sight of the important job that lies ahead.

The weapons of war can be destroyed with relative ease. But the social habits, the economic order, the governmental structure which were party to forging those weapons are not so easy to change. The old structure of power and rule in Japan cannot be eliminated in a matter of weeks or even of months.

The creation of conditions under which political and economic democracy can flourish and survive is a continuing task. The importance of this creative process is so vital to the security and future well-being of us all that it can not be overemphasized. The terms of reference agreed to last December in Moscow placed the final and ultimate responsibility for formulating the policies and principles upon which the peace and security of the Pacific may well be based, in your hands.

The mere fact of your presence here signifies the solution of one of the many issues we have faced in concert with our Allies since the end of the war. The results of your labors will, I am sure, result in the solution of many more of the problems that are fast becoming milestones as we continue our march along the road of international cooperation.

I shall now ask General McCoy, the representative of the United States on this Commission, to act as your temporary chairman in order that you may proceed with the business of organizing yourselves for work under your terms of reference.

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Made in Washington on Feb. 26 at the first meeting of the Commission.

# North American Regional Broadcasting Conference

**Address by FRANCIS DE WOLF**

GENTLEMEN OF THE CONFERENCE: I had the pleasure on the forenoon of February 4, 1946 of bringing to you a word of greeting from the Department of State and of expressing its best wishes for your successful negotiations. At that time the target date for the closing of the Conference was February 15, 1946. The fact that only now, on February 25, are you able to reach a definitive decision, is indicative of the difficulties which confronted you. The further fact that you have reached a definitive decision at all is indicative of the success of your endeavors.

This Conference has been a most important one involving as it does important interests of industry and the public in the countries concerned, consequently placing upon the delegates and their advisers a heavy responsibility. It is to their credit that through three weeks of effort they have sought a solution of the problems confronting them which might be satisfactory so far as possible in the light of the diversity of interests involved. For their earnest endeavors the Department of State is deeply grateful and I am sure that the Federal Communications Commission joins it in that gratitude.

No general remarks of mine can properly appraise the value of this Conference but an outline of its tangible accomplishments may be indicative of the value of its endeavors.

(1). It avoided the negotiation at this time of a new North American Regional Broadcasting Convention which would last for a long period and which was generally considered to be undesirable at present.

(2). The Conference prescribed a course of procedure looking toward the eventual negotiation, two or three years hence, of a new North American Regional Broadcasting Agreement in order that the preparation for the negotiation of that important document might be carried forward in an orderly and efficient manner.

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Mr. de Wolf is Chief of the Telecommunications Division, Office of Transport and Communications Policy, Department of State.

(3). In an effort to avoid confusion and in fact possible chaos in the standard broadcast band through the absence of any North American Regional Agreement after the conclusion of the present Convention on March 28, 1946 provision was made for the continuance in effect of the essential provisions of the existing NARBA Agreement including the continued application of the desirable engineering standards of the present Convention. This was accomplished by means of an interim agreement carrying forward the terms of the existing NARBA subject to certain modifications and additions outlined therein.

(4). There was maintained the solidarity of the inter-American front which seems so desirable.

(5). There was set up a North American Regional Engineering Committee, an international body clothed with authority to test the signals of stations, new and old, in the various countries party to the Interim Agreement so that interference might constantly be avoided or corrected.

(6). It would appear that the Interim Agreement will in no wise affect the large number of *local* broadcasting stations in the United States.

(7). Spokesmen for the regional broadcasting stations have indicated that they will be in a better position under the new agreement than has previously been the case.

(8). Of the 25 clear channel stations in the United States, 20 have not been adversely affected. Two of the remaining five have stated that while they are not happy over the outcome in this particular they would not object to the concessions made on their channels and a third has long since been derogated in this country.

It is a source of profound regret to the United States delegates and their advisers that some price has had to be paid for all of this. It is not a happy thought to them nor to the Department of State nor to the Federal Communications Commission that any United States channel or any United States station should suffer in any particular. It is deeply regretted that two such channels may hereby be adversely affected. In an effort to avoid

*(Continued on page 400)*

# Objectives of International Economic Foreign Policy

## MESSAGE OF THE PRESIDENT TO THE CONGRESS

[Released to the press by the White House February 28]

*To the Congress of the United States:* On July 31, 1945, the Bretton Woods Agreements Act became law. In that legislation the Congress established the National Advisory Council on International Monetary and Financial Problems "in order to co-ordinate the policies and operations of the representatives of the United States on the Fund and the Bank and of all agencies of the Government which make or participate in making foreign loans or which engage in foreign financial, exchange or monetary transactions." The Congress provided that the membership of the Council should consist of the Secretary of the Treasury, as Chairman, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Commerce, the Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, and the Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Export-Import Bank of Washington.

On August 9, 1945, the Secretary of the Treasury submitted for my approval a proposal as to the manner in which the National Advisory Council should proceed in performing the task assigned it. The essence of this proposal is contained in the following excerpt from the communication which the Secretary of the Treasury sent to me:

"As you can see from the attached memorandum, the United States Government is now extending financial assistance to foreign governments through a large number of programs, administered by different departments and agencies, and with different procedures for inter-agency consultation. In order for the Council to carry out the functions assigned to it, it seems to me necessary that the Council should have a picture of the over-all program of financial transactions which it is proposed to carry out in the next period. On such a basis, we can make decisions in a rational way, strike the best bargains with foreign countries, and save money for the taxpayer."

On August 10, 1945, I expressed my complete approval of the proposal and requested the Council to proceed along the lines indicated. Promptly thereafter the Council completed its organization and commenced to function without delay. Since

that time the Council has labored unremittingly in the performance of its duties.

I have now received from the National Advisory Council a document containing significant conclusions concerning the entire problem of foreign lending. The Council in submitting the document to me stated:

"At an early date the Council undertook to consider proposals and applications for foreign loans, and to study the problems and broad implications of foreign lending. The statement which is now submitted to you is an outgrowth of these activities of the Council and represents our present views. The Council will continue to study these matters and will report further to you as the rapidly changing conditions at home and abroad may require."

This document, which is based upon the careful study and direct experience of the body established by the Congress to coordinate the foreign financial activities of this Government, I now transmit to the Congress for its information and consideration. The document is attached hereto.

I fully endorse the recommendations of the National Advisory Council. Furthermore, I wish to emphasize that in my judgment the successful execution of this policy, including the implementation of the Financial Agreement with the United Kingdom, which I transmitted to the Congress on January 30, 1946, is of basic importance in the attainment of the objectives of the economic foreign policy of the United States. The international economic cooperation which is the keynote of our economic foreign policy must accompany international political cooperation, and we must achieve both if world peace is to be enduring.

The statement of the National Advisory Council concerning foreign loans reaches the conclusion that the Export-Import Bank will require during the next fiscal year additional lending authority of \$1 $\frac{1}{4}$  billion. I endorse this conclusion and at a later date I will discuss further with the Congress the need of appropriate legislation.

HARRY S. TRUMAN

THE WHITE HOUSE  
March 1, 1946

**STATEMENT OF THE FOREIGN LOAN POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT BY  
THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COUNCIL ON INTERNATIONAL MONETARY AND FINAN-  
CIAL PROBLEMS***February 21, 1946*

1. The foreign loan program of the United States, by assisting in the restoration of the productive capacities of war-devastated countries and by facilitating the sound economic development of other areas, is directed towards the creation of an international economic environment permitting a large volume of trade among all nations. This program is predicated on the view that a productive and peaceful world must be free from warring economic blocs and from barriers which obstruct the free flow of international trade and productive capital. Only by the reestablishment of high levels of production and trade the world over can the United States be assured in future years of a sustained level of exports appropriate to the maintenance of high levels of domestic production and employment.

By far the greatest part of the program of reconstruction is being carried out with the resources of the war-devastated countries. UNRRA takes care only of those immediate relief needs which cannot be met out of the resources of the countries involved. Another part of this program is being carried out through sales of surplus property, such sales being made on credit terms or for local foreign currencies where sales for cash payment in United States dollars cannot be made. The rest of the job must be handled on a loan basis.

2. The International Bank will be the principal agency to make foreign loans for reconstruction and development which private capital cannot furnish on reasonable terms. It provides a means by which the risks as well as the benefits from international lending will be shared by all of its members. It is expected that the International Bank will begin lending operations in the latter half of 1946 and that during the calendar year 1947 the International Bank will assume the primary responsibility for meeting the world's international capital requirements that cannot be met by private investors on their own account and risk. With its present membership, the International Bank will be authorized to lend approximately \$7.5 billion. The bulk of the funds for the loans made through the International Bank will be raised in the private capital markets of member countries, particularly in the United States. However, since this new

institution will take time to develop a lending program, it will probably not be in a position to enter into more than a small volume of commitments this year.

3. The proposed loan to Britain requiring Congressional authorization is a special case, but one which is an integral part of the foreign economic program of this Government. No other country has the same crucial position in world trade as England. Because of the wide use of the pound sterling in world trade, the large proportion of the world's trade which is carried on by the countries of the British Empire, and the extreme dependence of England upon imports, the financial and commercial practices of Britain are of utmost significance in determining what kind of world economy we shall have. The early realization of the full objectives of the Bretton Woods program, including the elimination of exchange restrictions and other barriers to world trade and investment, requires an immediate solution to Britain's financial problem. The International Monetary Fund Agreement permits the continued imposition of certain of these restrictions for as much as five years; in the Financial Agreement of December 6, 1945, the British agree to their removal within one year from the effective date of that agreement. It is the view of the Council that the British case is unique and will not be a precedent for a loan to any other country.

4. In July 1945, the Congress, for the purpose of making loans to war-devastated areas during the period prior to the inauguration of the International Bank and for the promotion of American exports and other special purposes, increased the lending power of the Export-Import Bank by \$2.8 billion, making its total lending power \$3.5 billion. At the end of 1945 the Export-Import Bank had outstanding commitments, including money authorized for cotton loans, of \$1,560 million of which \$1,040 million was committed in the last half of 1945. The \$1,040 million of commitments made during the last half of 1945 consisted of:

(a) \$655 million for the purchase of goods which originally had been included in the lend-lease programs to Belgium, Netherlands, and France;

(b) \$165 million for the purchase of other goods and services necessary for the reconstruction of Belgium, Denmark, Netherlands, and Norway;

(c) \$100 million available to various European countries, including Finland, Belgium, Czechoslovakia, France, Italy, Netherlands and Poland, for the purchase of raw cotton, and

(d) \$120 million for specific export and development programs, mostly to Latin American countries.

On January 1, 1946, the Export-Import Bank had unused lending power of \$1.9 billion for making additional commitments. In addition to the \$1.9 billion, there will be available during the fiscal year 1947 about \$50 million from repayment of principal and an additional sum (possibly \$100 million) from the cancellation of earlier commitments.

5. Pending the effective operation of the International Bank, it has been the policy of this Government to limit loans through the Export-Import Bank for reconstruction and development to the immediate, minimum needs of the borrower. Among the factors taken into consideration in making loans of this character are: (1) the urgency of the need of the borrower; (2) the borrower's own resources; (3) the possibility of obtaining the loan from other sources: private capital markets and other governments; (4) the ability of the borrower to make effective use of the funds; (5) the capacity of the borrower to repay; and (6) the impact of the loan on our domestic economy.

6. It is the view of the Council that, pending the establishment and operation of the International Bank, this Government can meet only a small proportion of the undoubtedly large needs of foreign countries for credits for reconstruction and development.

After careful consideration of all factors, the Council has concluded that the most urgent foreign needs will involve negotiations for loan commitments by the Export-Import Bank of approximately \$3 $\frac{1}{4}$  billion in the period from January 1946 through June 1947. This is exclusive of the proposed credit to Britain.

Since the available funds of the Export-Import Bank are about \$2 billion, it will be necessary in order to carry out this program to ask Congress to increase the lending authority of the Bank by \$1 $\frac{1}{4}$  billion. Although this is a substantial in-

crease, the Council believes that it is a minimum figure.

It is only through careful screening that it will be possible to carry out the program within the limits of the additional funds which the Congress will be asked to make available to the Bank. It is the established policy of the United States Government carefully to scrutinize each loan application to determine that the need is urgent and that the funds can be obtained from no other source than the Export-Import Bank.

7. On balance the loan program will be beneficial to our domestic economy. In the transition from war to peace, expanded foreign trade will not only assist the reconstruction of foreign countries, but also ease the reconversion problem of a number of domestic industries.

During the war many of our important industries, particularly in the field of capital goods, were built up to capacities far in excess of any foreseeable peacetime domestic demands. With the elimination of war demands, much of this American productive capacity may be unused. Such a situation has already arisen, for instance, with reference to railroad equipment, machine tools, power and transmission equipment, and certain types of general industrial machinery. This is also true for some of the metals, heavy chemicals, synthetic rubber, and other industrial materials. Similarly, we have quantities of cotton, tobacco and other agricultural products which are surplus to domestic needs. It is fortunate that this excess productive capacity is for many items which are most urgently needed by the war-devastated countries.

However, a part of the foreign demand will fall on products which are at present scarce in American markets. The Department of Commerce estimates that perhaps one-fourth of the proceeds of foreign loans will be spent on such products. In these cases the export demand, although small in relation to current domestic demand, contributes to inflationary pressures in the United States economy, and allocation and export controls must be maintained in order both to prevent any undue drain on domestic supplies and to assure that the minimum essential needs of other countries are met.

In this connection, account must be taken not only of the fact that there is an inevitable delay in the spending of the loans but also that the Export-

Import Bank discourages the employment of loan proceeds for the purchase of commodities in scarce supply. It is also the policy of the Government to prevent the proceeds of loans from being used to purchase goods in the United States market when similar supplies are for sale as surplus property.

The figure of \$3½ billion in requirements through the fiscal year 1947 represents anticipated commitments and not amounts which will be actually loaned or spent. For example, on January 1, 1946, the net outstanding loans of the Export-Import Bank amounted to only \$252 million although the total amount committed was \$1.6 billion. In order to permit foreign governments to plan their import programs and to permit United States producers to schedule their production, loan commitments by the Export-Import Bank must be made well in advance of actual use of loan funds.

In view of these considerations, it is believed that a foreign lending program adequate to meet the minimum needs of foreign countries will provide additional production and employment in many American industries, and that any temporary sacrifice involved in other areas of the economy will be small compared to the long-range advantages to the United States of a peaceful, active, and growing world economy.

8. A basic question to be considered is whether at a later period foreign countries will be able to service large American loans and investments. There is little doubt regarding the ability of debtor countries after their economies have been fully reconstructed to increase their national income sufficiently to handle the service charges on American loans and investments, providing an undue part of national income of borrowing countries is not diverted to military expenditures. This increase can be brought about through the modernization of economically backward areas, increased employment, and the utilization of new productive techniques, and well-directed foreign loans will make an important contribution to this development.

The ability of borrowing countries to develop an export surplus sufficient to meet service charges on foreign loans will depend in large measure upon the level of world trade. A high level of world trade will in turn depend upon the maintenance of a high level of world income and a reduction of

the barriers to international trade which have grown up in the past. A high level of world income, and of national income in the United States, will be greatly influenced by the domestic economic policies of the United States and of other major countries. It is expected that the proposed International Trade Organization will play an important role in securing the international economic environment necessary for the maintenance of high levels of world trade. The operation of the International Monetary Fund should assure the orderly functioning of a system of multilateral payments, and this will make it possible for debtor countries to convert their export surplus with any country into the currency in which their obligations must be discharged.

9. Fundamentally, however, the ability of foreign countries to transfer interest and amortization on foreign loans to the United States depends upon the extent to which we make dollars available to the world through imports of goods and services including personal remittances and tourist expenditures, and through new investments abroad. As a last resort, the world outside of the United States has a current gold production of possibly \$1 billion per year to add to their present foreign exchange reserves, which can be dipped into to ensure payment.

As long as new American investment exceeds interest and amortization on outstanding foreign investment, the question of net repayment on our total foreign investment will not arise, although as individual investments are paid off the composition of our foreign investment may shift. It is impossible to prophesy when receipts on foreign investment will exceed new investment, as American investment abroad will depend on many future developments. In a world of peace, prosperity, and a liberal trade policy, there may well be a revival and continuation of American private investment on a large scale, including a reinvestment of the profits of industry, that will put the period of net repayment far in the future. Such an increase of investment is a natural and wholesome development for a wealthy community.

When net repayment begins, whether this be a few years or many decades from now, it will involve an excess of imports of goods and services (including foreign travel by Americans) over our total exports of goods and services. The growth in our population and the depletion of our natural

resources and the increase in our standard of living will increase the need for imported products, and these developments together with the maintenance of a high and stable level of employment will facilitate this adjustment. The annual interest and amortization payments on the entire present and contemplated Export-Import Bank program, the British loan, and the International Bank loans floated in U. S. markets will be less than \$1 billion. The receipt of payments on our foreign loans in the form of goods and services is entirely consistent with increased exports from this country and rising production at home, and will contribute to a rising living standard in the United States in the same way that a private individual's earnings on his investments make possible an increase in his own living standard.

10. The loan policies stated here are in full accord with the basic political and economic interests of the United States. The National Advisory Council, which was established by the Congress in the Bretton Woods Agreement Act and consists of the Secretary of the Treasury as Chairman, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Commerce, the Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, and the Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Export-Import Bank, has the responsibility of coordinating the lending and credit programs of this Government, and of achieving maximum consistency between American Government lending and the lending operations of the International Bank.

This country is supporting the United Nations Organization wholeheartedly, and the success of the United Nations Organization depends not only on political agreement but also on economic improvement. These loans are for economic reconstruction and development. They will enable the borrowing countries to increase their own production, relieve their foreign trade from excessive regulation, and expand their trade with us. Economic stability will foster peace. This program of foreign lending is essential to the realization of the main objective of the foreign economic policy of the United States, which is to lay the economic foundations of the peace.

FRED M. VINSON  
*Secretary of the Treasury,*  
Chairman of the National Advisory  
Council on International Monetary  
and Financial Problems

JAMES F. BYRNES  
*Secretary of State*  
M. S. ECCLES  
Chairman of the Board of  
Governors of the Federal  
Reserve System  
H. A. WALLACE  
*Secretary of Commerce*  
WM. McC. MARTIN, JR.  
Chairman of the Board of Directors  
of the Export-Import Bank of  
Washington

## EXPORT-IMPORT BANK OF WASHINGTON

### LOANS AUTHORIZED BY EXPORT-IMPORT BANK SUBSEQUENT TO JUNE 30, 1945 (AS OF DECEMBER 31, 1945)

<i>Country and Obligor</i>	<i>Date of Authorization</i>	<i>Amount of Authorization (In millions of dollars)</i>	<i>Purpose</i>
<b>LATIN AMERICA</b>			
Brazil			
Lloyd Brasileiro . . . . .	9/11/45	38.0	Purchase of Cargo Vessels
Chile			
Chilean State Railways (Baldwin Locomotive Works).	7/13/45	1.2	Purchase of Locomotives
Chilean State Railways (Electrical Export Corps.)	7/13/45	2.0	Purchase of Electrical Equipment
Fomento Corporation . . . . .	9/11/45	28.0	Purchase of Steel Mill Equipment
Fomento Corporation . . . . .	9/11/45	5.0	Purchase of Electrical and Other Equipment
Ecuador			
Republie of Ecuador . . . . .	7/13/45	1.0	Purchase of Engineering Services
Mexico			
United States of Mexico * . . . . .	3/21/45	10.0	Highway Construction, Equipment and Services

## LOANS AUTHORIZED BY EXPORT-IMPORT BANK SUBSEQUENT TO JUNE 30, 1945 (AS OF DECEMBER 31, 1945)

<i>Country and Obligor</i>	<i>Date of Authorization</i>	<i>Amount of Authorization (In millions of dollars)</i>	<i>Purpose</i>
<b>LATIN AMERICA—Continued</b>			
<b>Brazil—Continued</b>			
Nacional Financiera*.....	3/21/45	20.0	Purchase of Electrical Equipment.
Fred Leighton.....	10/23/45	.15	Import of Mexican Handicraft.
<b>Peru</b>			
Cia. Peruana Del Santa* (Westinghouse Electric Int'l. Co.).....	6/12/45	.35	Purchase of Electrical Equipment.
<b>TOTAL LATIN AMERICA.....</b>		<b>105.7</b>	
<b>EUROPE</b>			
<b>Belgium</b>			
Kingdom of Belgium.....	9/11/45	55.0	Purchase of United States Goods and Services (Lend-Lease 3-c terms).
Kingdom of Belgium.....	9/11/45	45.0	Purchase of United States Goods and Services.
<b>Denmark</b>			
Kingdom of Denmark.....	7/13/45	20.0	Purchase of United States Goods and Services.
<b>France</b>			
Republie of France.....	9/11/45	550.0	Purchase of United States Goods and Services (Lend-Lease 3-c terms).
<b>Netherlands</b>			
Kingdom of the Netherlands.....	9/11/45	50.0	Purchase of United States Goods and Services (Lend-Lease 3-c terms).
Kingdom of the Netherlands.....	9/11/45	50.0	Purchase of United States Goods and Services
<b>Norway</b>			
Kingdom of Norway.....	7/13/45	50.0	Purchase of United States Goods and Services
<b>Various European Countries</b>			
Various European Governments.....	10/8/45	100.0	Purchase of Raw Cotton
<b>TOTAL EUROPE.....</b>		<b>920.0</b>	
<b>ASIA</b>			
<b>Saudi Arabia</b>			
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.....	4/12/45	5.0	Purchase of Goods and Services
<b>Turkey</b>			
Turkish State Airways (Westinghouse Elec. Int'l. Co.).....	9/11/45	3.06	Purchase of Airport Equipment
<b>TOTAL ASIA.....</b>		<b>8.06</b>	
<b>VARIOUS COUNTRIES</b>			
Governments of Various Countries (Int'l. Standard Electric Corp.).....	9/11/45	5.0	Purchase of Communications Equipment
<b>SPECIAL EXPORTER-IMPORTER CREDITS.....</b>		<b>1.0</b>	Various
<b>GRAND TOTAL.....</b>		<b>1,039.76</b>	
Undisbursed commitments as of June 30, 1945 (adjusted for expirations and cancellations up to December 31, 1945). ....		326.46	
Outstanding loans as of June 30, 1945 (adjusted for repayments between June 30, 1945 and December 31, 1945). ....		193.43	
Total commitments as of December 31, 1945. ....		1,559.65	

\* Credits authorized before June 30, 1945 but not entered on the books of the Bank as commitments until after that date.

## The United Nations Meet

*A Discussion of the United Nations Meeting Recently Concluded in London by Representative Sol Bloom, Democrat, N. Y., Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee and a Member of the U.S. Delegation to the United Nations Assembly in London; Benjamin V. Cohen, Counselor of the Department of State and Senior Adviser to the U.S. Delegation in London; Alger Hiss, Director of the Office of Special Political Affairs, Department of State, and Principal Adviser to the U.S. Delegation in London. The Text of Their Conversation on the Air, Released to the Press on March 2, is Presented Below. The Broadcast Was the Tenth in a Group of State Department Programs in the NBC University of the Air Series Entitled "Our Foreign Policy". Sterling Fisher, Director of the NBC University of the Air, Was Chairman of their Discussion.*

FISHER: In this first year of the atomic age, the eyes of all people in all countries are focused on the United Nations. This has been especially true during recent weeks, with the United Nations meeting in London. There is a very general realization that if the United Nations Organization fails, then we're in for trouble. So the verbal battles in London were taken very seriously by spectators over here in the bleacher seats. Congressman Bloom, as the senior statesman of this trio, would you like to evaluate the London meetings?

BLOOM: Mr. Fisher, the London session was a tremendous success. The United Nations Organization was turned into a going concern, ready to set up headquarters right here in the United States and start functioning. It's the hope of the world. If it can't be made to work, what practical alternative has anyone got to suggest?

FISHER: Mr. Hiss, you have been in on this from the beginnings—from Dumbarton Oaks and Yalta and San Francisco to the recent meetings in England. Did the London sessions measure up to your expectations?

HISS: Yes. And I think that all records have been broken by the speed with which the United Nations Organization was established. You remember that only a little over a year ago, at Yalta, the date was set for the San Francisco conference.

FISHER: It wasn't all smooth sailing in London, though, judging from the reports. At least from here it looked as if there were some real fireworks over the hot issues that went to the Security Council. Mr. Cohen, was the United Nations Organization ever in real danger from the controversies over Iran, and Greece, and so on?

COHEN: No, Mr. Fisher. The discussion was frank and even heated at times, but there was more light than fire.

FISHER: Do you think, then, that it was a good thing these issues were brought up at the very beginning, almost before the Security Council could be organized?

COHEN: Certainly, no harm was done. We might have hoped that the Council would have a chance to work out its rules of procedure before it had to take up these controversial cases. But the Council's job is to adjust itself to the needs of the world.

HISS: Certainly the world is not likely to adjust itself to the Council's convenience.

COHEN: Of course we'd all be happier if these hot spots didn't exist. But they do. And if they aren't being straightened out, it's better to drag them out into the open than to let them fester underneath the surface. The discussion has cleared the air. And we don't want to see the Council isolated from the facts of life.

BLOOM: I'd go so far as to say it's a *good thing* to bring these disputes up *now*. Otherwise, if they wait and smolder, fear will result. Why not talk about them? No one can object to the truth coming out. Let's get the operation over and by the time of the next Assembly meeting maybe the patient will be convalescing.

FISHER: Well, as Mr. Cohen said, Congressman Bloom, the patient doesn't seem to be the worse for it.

BLOOM: As long as people are willing to sit down and talk over matters, and argue and debate, these issues can be resolved. The fact that they did come up and were dealt with, and the United Nations Organization is still intact, is proof that it has a good deal of strength.

COHEN: Of course, Congressman, some of the questions were raised as a sort of counter-attack. Some thought that's why the problems of Greece and Indonesia were brought to the Council table.

But they were real questions nevertheless. Don't you think that this sort of rough-and-tumble argument is like a congressional debate? The same sort of charges and countercharges.

BLOOM: Certainly it's more like a congressional debate than like a conference of diplomats.

COHEN: I think that's a healthful thing—it reflects the real and moving forces of life. Of course, there's always some risk of injured feelings when live issues are discussed frankly. But frank speech doesn't mean that the various viewpoints can't be reconciled. And as the London meetings went on, I think the spirit of the discussions constantly improved.

FISHER: But, Mr. Cohen, was anything really settled as a result of these debates?

COHEN: I can't say much was done in the way of definite settlement, but I do believe that in most cases the situation was improved as a result of the discussions.

HISS: In fact, the town-meeting method of dealing with controversial questions may turn out to be a new technique of conciliation.

FISHER: How do you mean, Mr. Hiss?

HISS: It not only lays the issues wide open, before the world, but it gives each party to the dispute insight into the attitudes of the other side—don't you think so, Congressman Bloom?

BLOOM: Yes, and it gives both sides a chance to fight it out on a verbal level, so that more serious battles can be avoided.

FISHER: Mr. Cohen, I know your work in London brought you into close touch with the Security Council. Just what results were achieved on each of these cases—Iran and the others? There is a feeling in some quarters that the Security Council did a pretty good job of dodging the issues.

COHEN: In the case of Iran, I think the discussions gave great impetus to a settlement outside the Council. Iran and the Soviet Union are now negotiating for a settlement.

FISHER: Did the Security Council wash its hands of the whole affair, then?

COHEN: No, by no means. It reserved the right to discuss the case again if it is not settled in accordance with the principles of the Charter.

BLOOM: It did show that the small nations can bring their grievances before a world forum. That itself is some protection for them.

FISHER: From the reports, the Greek case was the touchiest of all those that came up.

COHEN: That is difficult to say. The Greek case was very tangled; but in the end there was a general feeling that most of the tension in Greece had been due to the bitter civil war that had occurred there, and that Britain is now doing her best to assist in maintaining order. No solution was reached on Greece, but the discussion undoubtedly led to greater understanding on the part of all who participated.

FISHER: And what about the Ukrainian demand for an investigation of British actions in Java?

COHEN: The discussions on Indonesia were helpful in two ways: First, they made it clear that all members of the Security Council, including the Dutch and British representatives, were sympathetic with the development of Indonesian nationalism, and with Indonesian aspirations for self-government; and second, they showed how much the situation is complicated by the past activities and continuing influence of the Japanese in Java. The Ukrainian representative himself suggested that the assassination of the British General who was trying to negotiate a truce was probably the act of a Japanese agent.

FISHER: But, Mr. Cohen, did this discussion have any concrete results?

COHEN: I think the discussion may improve the chances of a fair settlement coming out of the negotiations recently started by the Dutch, looking toward self-government for the Indies. The Council turned down the Ukrainian request for an investigation because it was feared that this might interfere with the negotiations, and aggravate local strife. But the Council's views should be a factor in the settlement, when one is finally reached.

FISHER: Then there was one other major issue—the demand by Syria and Lebanon that the British and French troops withdraw from their territory immediately.

COHEN: The discussions on Syria and Lebanon should speed up the withdrawal of foreign troops from those countries.

FISHER: But no definite formula was found?

COHEN: All were agreed that the foreign troops should be removed but they could not agree on a formula. Mr. Stettinius offered a resolution calling for withdrawal "at the earliest practicable moment". This was not definite enough to satisfy the Russians. So it failed of passage, because under the Charter big-five unanimity is required.

**FISHER:** The Russian veto, then, produced a stalemate?

**COHEN:** Not at all. The British and French promptly declared that they would carry out the Stettinius resolution and report to the Council.

**Hiss:** By turning the spotlight on these issues, and reserving the right to take them up again if the need arises, the Security Council has contributed to world peace.

**FISHER:** Just how do you think the Russians feel about all this, Mr. Cohen? Do they feel that the whole world is lined up against the Soviet Union?

**COHEN:** No, I don't think so. Of course there are differences—some very fundamental differences—in our points of view. But the Russians found considerable support for a number of their suggestions. Speaking generally, some countries appear to have greater confidence in the United Nations than others. But confidence, developed by working together, is the only way to learn how to live together.

**BLOOM:** Foreign Vice Commissar Vyshinsky said toward the end that we had all fought hard for our respective viewpoints on issues before us—but out of the clashes had come a better understanding of our common interests.

**FISHER:** Was there no truth then, Representative Bloom, to the published report that Vyshinsky was ready to walk out of the Security Council at one point, and to take the Russian Delegation with him?

**BLOOM:** That's pure rubbish! If they felt that way, they kept it a secret amongst themselves.

**FISHER:** In any case, they didn't withdraw.

**Hiss:** As for the British, Prime Minister Attlee spoke for them when he said, "The United Nations Organization must become the overriding factor in foreign policy".

**COHEN:** There was no indication at any time that any of the great powers didn't intend to play their full part in the United Nations.

**FISHER:** Over here, there was great interest in the selection of the site for the United Nations. Mr. Cohen, what was the feeling among the delegates about the area that was selected?

**COHEN:** I think there was a general feeling that the decision to locate somewhere in Westchester County, N. Y., or in Fairfield County, Conn., was a satisfactory one. Originally, of course, there was a tug-of-war as to whether the site should be in Europe or America and as to whether, in

America, it should be on the east or west coast. But most of the delegates felt that the area chosen was as acceptable as any.

**FISHER:** Congressman Bloom, as a New Yorker, what did you think of the area recommended for the headquarters?

**BLOOM:** I have no particular feeling about it as a New Yorker, Mr. Fisher. You realize, of course, that the General Assembly did not adopt the recommendation of the inspection group which came over here. That group suggested a specific tract of about 42 square miles. Instead, the Assembly voted just to locate somewhere within the area of the two counties mentioned and to appoint a new headquarters commission to survey the whole area. I believe that Americans who know the area should be consulted before the final decision is made, which won't be until the Assembly meets again in September.

**Hiss:** The commission is instructed to call in American experts.

**BLOOM:** Whatever the decision, we've got to stand by the will of the majority. It's the work of the United Nations that counts, not the location.

**FISHER:** You don't take the objections of the local residents too seriously, then?

**BLOOM:** Wherever you put it, Mr. Fisher, there would be objections. Some will have to move out. But they'll be fairly compensated. And I'd like to point this out: Our homes, mansions, and farms won't be worth much to us or to anyone else if the United Nations Organization doesn't succeed. This is more than a personal matter—the peace and security of the world are at stake.

**Hiss:** I think a lot of us could learn a lesson from the chief of Bikini Atoll. Did you see that news story about him this week?

**FISHER:** No, Mr. Hiss, I don't believe I did.

**Hiss:** Well, Bikini Atoll is where they are setting up the experiment on the effects of atomic bombs on warships. Navy officials went down there and told the 160-odd natives of Bikini the reasons for selecting the tiny isle for the experiment, and about the dangers involved and how the experiment might prove beneficial to world peace. The natives were asked to leave the island voluntarily. They listened to the officers, and then held a tribal meeting to vote on the proposition. Afterward their chief spoke to the Navy men about as follows: "We love our homes. It is hard to leave our native land. But if our going will help to preserve world peace, we will do it gladly".

FISHER: There's a very real parallel in that story.

BLOOM: I do want to say this: I think the decision to locate the United Nations over here is an honor to the United States. It emphasized once more our tremendous responsibility for making the Organization succeed.

FISHER: Mr. Hiss, I know you have followed this controversy over the site very closely. Wasn't another attempt made in London to locate the United Nations in San Francisco?

Hiss: Not the permanent site. The Australians did move to locate the *temporary* headquarters in San Francisco, but their motion lost by two votes. So the New York area was selected for both the interim and permanent headquarters.

FISHER: And how did our Delegation vote?

Hiss: We didn't vote on the location of the site—we preferred to leave the decision on that to the other nations.

FISHER: I understand that Senator Vandenberg and other members of the Delegation questioned the necessity of acquiring 42 square miles of land for the site.

Hiss: That's right. In the end, the question of size was left open by a vote of 22 to 17 on a motion by the Netherlands Delegation. The Dutch asked that a commission look into the question and report to the second part of the General Assembly session in New York next fall on alternative plans for different sizes, beginning with two square miles and running up to 42. We expressed ourselves as in favor of that proposal.

FISHER: The question has been raised as to whether we would have to sign away our sovereignty over the site. Mr. Cohen, as Counselor of the State Department, what do you have to say about that?

COHEN: The United Nations will acquire title to the land by paying a fair price for it, as guaranteed by our Constitution. But there will be no transfer of sovereignty, nor will there be any impairment of the legal rights of the residents in the area.

Hiss: There will, of course, have to be some special arrangements with this Government for policing the area, and so on.

COHEN: The area will remain part of the United States and of the State or States in which it is located.

FISHER: Coming back to the work of the United

Nations General Assembly—Congressman Bloom, will you bring us up to date on its main accomplishments?

BLOOM: Well, Mr. Fisher, this was an organizing session, and a great deal of the work consisted of electing officers, setting up committees, approving provisional rules of procedure, adopting a provisional budget, and so on. Dr. Paul-Henri Spaak of Belgium did a beautiful job as President of the Assembly.

FISHER: Now, what about the committees of the Assembly? Mr. Hiss, what did they accomplish?

Hiss: Most of the questions that came before the Assembly were taken up first in one or another of the six committees. Senator Connally was our representative on the Political and Security Committee, which studied, among other things, the five-power recommendation for an Atomic Energy Commission.

FISHER: And the Committee's report on that was adopted by the Assembly?

Hiss: Yes—unanimously.

COHEN: It's highly significant that there was no disagreement on this question, since it's one of the most vital questions facing the United Nations.

FISHER: Mr. Bloom, who serves on the Atomic Energy Commission?

BLOOM: Representatives of the 11 members of the Security Council plus Canada. This is the group which will go out to Bikini Atoll to observe the Navy's atom-bomb experiment.

FISHER: Mr. Cohen, you were directly concerned with setting up this Atomic Energy Commission. What will its job be?

COHEN: Its purpose is to inquire into the whole range of problems created by the discovery of atomic energy and related matters, and to provide some plan for insuring that these new developments will be used for peaceful and not for destructive purposes.

FISHER: Then it won't be concerned with the technical secrets of the atom bomb?

COHEN: No. It will not deal with military secrets, but with the political and social problems created by the bomb and atomic energy in general. It will devise rules to control atomic energy for constructive purposes. The Commission has power only to recommend and then the governments will consider its recommendations.

**FISHER:** Will it recommend turning the atom bombs now in existence over to the United Nations police or security forces?

**COHEN:** It's too early to say. The resolution creating the Commission directs it to make proposals for the elimination of atomic and similar weapons from national armaments. In making such proposals the Commission might recommend that the bombs to be eliminated only from the national armaments should be turned over to the United Nations, or it might recommend their destruction.

**FISHER:** To get back to the Political and Security Committee of the Assembly—Mr. Hiss, what other issues did it take up?

**HISS:** Well, there was a spirited debate between Senator Connally and Mr. Manuilsky of the Ukraine on whether the World Federation of Trade Unions would be the sole labor organization to have consultative arrangements with the Economic and Social Council.

**BLOOM:** Which ended by the Senator and Mr. Manuilsky shaking hands.

**HISS:** Senator Connally maintained that the A. F. of L. should also have a consultative status. In the end the Assembly decided to recommend that the A. F. of L. and the World Federation of Trade Unions, to which the CIO belongs, both be given consultative status.

**FISHER:** And what about the other Assembly committees?

**HISS:** Congressman Bloom was our representative on the Economic and Financial Committee. He can tell you about that.

**BLOOM:** Its main job was reviewing the plans for the economic and social part of the United Nations. We also got action taken to broaden and strengthen the financial support for UNRRA—the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration. Some of us felt very strongly that the peace and security of the United Nations depended on UNRRA's work. How can you have a lasting peace when people are starving, and babies are crying for a piece of bread and something to keep them warm?

**COHEN:** What Representative Bloom didn't say, because he is too modest, is that he was largely responsible for getting agreement on the UNRRA resolution. As you know, Mr. Fisher, he introduced the original UNRRA legislation in the House of Representatives, and he carried the same fight forward in London. Mr. Philip Noel-Baker,

the British Minister of State, paid special tribute to Mr. Bloom's work on UNRRA.

**HISS:** That's right. Congressman Bloom made a great speech on this resolution, urging all of the United Nations to come into UNRRA. Under the Assembly's resolution, a committee has been set up to encourage contributions.

**COHEN:** Along this same line, Mr. Stettinius helped to secure passage of the resolution sponsored by the "Big Five" calling for drastic action to meet the food famine which threatens large areas of the world.

**FISHER:** Mr. Hiss, what other Assembly committees were there?

**HISS:** A third one was the Social, Cultural and Humanitarian Committee. Mrs. Roosevelt was our representative there, together with former Senator Townsend.

**COHEN:** They did a good job under very difficult conditions.

**FISHER:** What was Mrs. Roosevelt's outstanding achievement, Mr. Cohen?

**COHEN:** First, winning the hearts of our Republican delegates; and second, her work on the refugee resolution. She introduced this resolution on behalf of our Delegation and guided it through her Committee and the Assembly. Throughout, she insisted that no refugees, except war criminals, quislings, and traitors, should be forced to return to their own countries against their will. She eloquently defended her position in the Committee and on the floor of the Assembly and the final action fully upheld her position.

**FISHER:** Mr. Hiss, I believe another committee covered trusteeship.

**HISS:** Yes, Mr. John Foster Dulles represented us on that Committee, together with Congressman Bloom.

**BLOOM:** Mr. Dulles did a fine job.

**HISS:** Then there was the Administrative and Budgetary Committee.

**FISHER:** Who represented us on that Committee, Mr. Hiss?

**HISS:** Senator Vandenberg. He labored mightily on that, with the help of Don Stone of the Budget Bureau. They had to go over a whole mass of proposed administrative regulations, and work out a provisional budget for the United Nations.

**FISHER:** Congressman Bloom, how much will our share be?

**BLOOM:** For the provisional budget, the Assem-

bly adopted approximately the same scale of contributions as the Food and Agriculture Organization has adopted. Our share of FAO expenses is 25 percent.

**Hiss:** Most of the member countries won't want any one nation to pay too large a proportion.

**Bloom:** No. If any single nation contributed most of the funds, this might lead to a suspicion that it could dominate the United Nations.

**Fisher:** Does that complete the list of Assembly committees, Mr. Hiss?

**Hiss:** No, there's a sixth—the Legal Committee. Mr. Cohen, can you tell us about that?

**Cohen:** Former Postmaster General Frank Walker was our representative on the Legal Committee. Among other things it examined the Assembly's proposed rules of procedures.

**Fisher:** Well, all this certainly shows what a complicated job it is to set up a world organization.

**Cohen:** I'd like to say, before we close, that every member of the American Delegation played a leading role in some phase of the London meetings. Every Delegate spoke in the Assembly and by long hours of hard work contributed greatly to the success of the meetings.

**Fisher:** Well, all this adds up to a major

achievement—getting an organization which is necessarily as complicated as the United Nations set up in the space of about a year, and not only setting it up, but dealing with some of the hottest issues facing the world at the same time. Of course, there is plenty of criticism of the United Nations already—and I suppose you would agree, Congressman Bloom, that the Organization has its shortcomings.

**Bloom:** There are those who think we should set up a full-fledged world government right now. My answer to them is this: We've got 51 nations banded together, which is a good start, at least. We went as far in delegating powers as the United States Senate and the Soviet Government and other governments were willing to go.

**Fisher:** You imply that the United Nations will be further strengthened in the future?

**Bloom:** Of course. Nothing stands still—there are bound to be changes and improvements in the United Nations Charter, just as there have been amendments to the United States Constitution. But the machinery is soundly built, and it has already shown it can stand stress and strain. Improvements in the Charter can follow in due time. Let's give it a fair chance.

## Commission of Experts To Prepare Report on Italy-Yugoslavia Boundary

[Released to the press March 1]

*Communiqué issued in London late Thursday evening, February 28, by the Council of Foreign Ministers' Deputies*

In accordance with the decisions of the Council of Foreign Ministers in September, the deputies to the Council of Foreign Ministers have appointed a commission of experts to prepare a report and recommendations on fixing the boundary between Italy and Yugoslavia, which boundary will in the main be the ethnic line leaving a minimum population under alien rule. In carrying out its task the commission of experts will take into consideration not only the ethnic composition of the areas to be investigated but also their special economic and geographical features.

The deputies have instructed the commission to study the documents concerning the boundary which have been submitted to the Council of For-

eign Ministers by the Governments of Yugoslavia and Italy, as well as the views which have been submitted by other United Nations Governments in accordance with the invitations which were extended to them by the Council of Foreign Ministers.

The deputies have also instructed the commission to proceed immediately to the area in question in order to study the ethnic composition of the population as well as the special economic and geographical features of that area.

On completion of its investigations on the spot the commission will return to London where it will prepare a final report and recommendations for submission to the Council of Foreign Ministers. The commission of experts will shortly arrive at Trieste and will consist of: M. Wolfram (France), M. Geraschenko (USSR), Mr. Walcock (UK), Dr. Mosely (US).

# Freedom of Information— A Check to Irresponsible Power

By ASSISTANT SECRETARY BRADEN

[Released to the press March 1]

It has been with pleasurable anticipation that I have looked forward to attending this dinner. For the privilege of being in your company and for the honor of addressing you, I am grateful. Also, I extend my sincere congratulations to the recipients of the awards, which are to be presented here tonight.

This occasion is important on four principal counts. First, it perpetuates the memory of Wendell L. Willkie; second, it does honor to representatives of a race struggling to surmount huge obstacles; third, it encourages responsible journalism; and lastly, the Wendell L. Willkie awards for Negro journalism exemplify in a gracious manner the practical application of liberalism.

In all these particulars the occasion is symbolic of the liberal, free spirit which is the hope of mankind in a world that has been forced to defend itself—and must continue unremittingly to defend itself—against intolerant ideologies directed at its enslavement.

Wendell Willkie, like many great leaders, does not fit into any one of the precise categories by which men ordinarily judge contemporary public figures. It would be as fatuous to assert that he was a great man because he was an outstanding internationalist or free-trader, Democrat or Republican, industrialist or lawyer, as it would be to attempt to sum up Abraham Lincoln's greatness by saying he was an abolitionist. There were thousands of abolitionists, but there was only one Lincoln. It is on these essentially independent and unique men, and they are few, that civilization ultimately depends for its salvation. They are the elect who, in the great crises of history, supply the leadership which gives drive and direction to the majority. In this connection let me quote to you what Walter Lippmann said the other day in a brief address commemorating Willkie's birthday: "The independence of Willkie", he said, "came not from eccentricity and the desire to be

different and conspicuous. It came from a profound sense, which is embodied in his phrase that this is 'one world', from the conviction that only those who remain independent—letting no separate party, class or cult possess them—that only such men can become united with other men."

At this gathering, the spirit of liberalism is represented, in action, by the presentation of these awards for Negro journalism. These prizes are directed not alone to the worthy winners but in ultimate effect to an entire group of our population, and they tacitly convey the message that the essential dignity of man, which is by right inviolate, is not identifiable with any ethic considerations but embraces all humanity.

The true liberal stands firmly on the successful experience and accumulated wisdom of the past, as he constantly seeks for progress by sound innovation. Liberalism, like so many other political and social concepts, is a word that has, in recent years, been much abused. It has been appropriated by both extremes of the political spectrum. Even advocates of totalitarian regimentation have not hesitated to claim it. I take it, however, that there is more than an etymological connection between *liberalism* and *liberality* and *liberty*. Liberalism is an attitude of heart and mind, expressed in a sort of spiritual magnanimity and tolerance, an outgoing generosity toward one's fellow man. It appreciates and cherishes the intrinsic worth of the individual, seeking always to enlarge the scope within which the individual may realize his worth. It breaks down the barriers of ignorance, of prejudice, of poverty, of malevolent self-interest, of bigotry—all of which impede the free play of the human spirit and thus degrade mankind. It looks for and hopes to find a spark of the divine in all men, and believes that the whole purpose of life is to cherish and encourage that spark whenever and wherever it

An address made at a dinner for Wendell L. Willkie Awards for Negro Journalism in Washington on March 1.

may be found. The liberal attitude is one essentially of tolerance and justice which seeks to free the spirit of man from its fetters.

The liberation of the human spirit has to cope with two kinds of obstacles. On the one hand, there are the restrictions imposed on great masses of people by misguided and ruthless groups—I might more correctly say gangs—generally at the point of a gun and in the name of a false nationalism. In our day this has taken the form of totalitarianism, which makes the individual the slave of the state. On the other hand, there are the ignorance and poverty that frustrate the aspiration to freedom and that make it impossible for men to discharge the responsibility that goes with freedom. For men cannot be free unless they have the means and the knowledge that enable them to govern themselves. Freedom does not mean lack of government; it means self-government. Self-government, in turn, depends on knowledge and that purest integrity which can only come from knowledge—and on economic opportunity.

This brings me to a principal point I wish to make. The presentations being made here tonight are awards for journalism, and as such they recognize the vital importance of perfecting that profession in the modern world. I venture to say that if we could have responsible, fully informed journalism functioning freely all over the world today, there would follow, inevitably, a rapid solution of our basic social and political problems leading toward the complete realization of liberal ideals. When there is light, an understanding is possible of the intricacies of social relationships; when there is understanding, a solution is not far distant. As Senator Elbert D. Thomas has stated: "So long as man lives upon the earth and is the social animal that he is, man's relationship with man will continue to be the most important thing in civilization. Men have to work courageously together to improve their relationships in world society."

Nothing is more important than that the people everywhere have free access to information—through books, through magazines, and chiefly through the press and the radio. If they could have this, they would quickly break down the barriers of ignorance and prejudice, and, having removed these obstacles, they would not allow themselves to be governed except by themselves. There is no nation and no area on earth where the great

mass of people, representing the popular will, are not opposed to war. If we have wars, nevertheless, it is in spite of the popular will, because large populations are not permitted to govern themselves or are not furnished the means to govern themselves. Consequently, they become the dupes or the slaves of malevolent minorities. There is no threat of war, however, where people are enlightened and self-governing.

Let me be more specific on this matter of free access to information. No informed peoples, anywhere in the world, can justifiably feel apprehensive that the Government of the United States will take this country into a war of aggression against them. The Government of the United States is the servant of the American people, and the American people are irrevocably opposed to aggression. There can be no doubt of the popular will in this matter because it is freely expressed in the newspapers, on the radio, through all the media of public opinion, and through the machinery of popular elections. No official, no general, no governmental group could force this country, against the informed and freely expressed will of the people, into a war of aggression. But within the last quarter century we have witnessed the birth and growth of governments which have been not the servants but the masters of the people and the people were simply tools of the dictators. If the group in power in such countries as these wants war, it has the means to obtain popular support for going to war simply by insulating the people against true information and furnishing them false information. The government does not follow an informed public opinion. On the contrary, a misinformed public opinion docilely follows the government. Where a government commands this irresponsible power, other countries must inevitably look to the defenses.

At incalculable cost in human and material wealth we have defeated the German and Japanese regimes on the battlefronts—at sea, in the air, and on land—all over the world. But the victory is incomplete. The Nazis driven underground remain and even are beginning to show their heads again; Fascism as a word is repudiated everywhere but its advocates continue to propagate their theories. Totalitarian ideologies and methods continue to be a grave menace to liberalism and liberty—and therefore to peace.

Before the war, from which we have just

emerged, there might have been some excuse for indifference, for ignorance, and for blindness to these ominous evils. But there can be no alibi for neglect now. To repeat the same mistakes again would be criminal. Certainly all of us are painfully exhausted by the nervous and physical strains of the war. It is far more pleasant to snatch a breathing spell and to relegate to the background affairs of moment and the great ideals for which we fought. Just as selfish purposes and unethical practices have followed after other wars, they are now appearing throughout our national and international life. But unless these processes are reversed, and that forthwith, the advance of civilization may be retarded by centuries.

It is not sufficient that all the United Nations are pledged to the defense of human rights and civil liberties. Under our system of self-government, it is imperative that each citizen, each group in the community, and, yes, each democratic nation be on the alert and actively defend the principles for which they stand. The mere utterance of noble sentiments and the signature of solemn pacts is futile unless there be positive action individually and collectively.

If free access to information were universally established, as it is established in this country, irresponsible power would be impossible and the informed will of the people, freely expressed, would obviate international suspicion and insure the maintenance of peace. That is why I feel justified in saying that peace and the realization of our liberal ideals depend in large measure on the free practice of responsible journalism throughout the world.

The spirit of liberalism is and always has been so much a part of this country that each citizen, irrespective of his actual performance, at least knows what are his rights and obligations, what are his fundamental freedoms. But when the individual is molded into the community our collective liberties too often are selfishly interpreted or forgotten and the highly practical objective of establishing a workable "one world" is ignored.

It must be a matter of gratification to all liberals that these awards are made for good journalism, that they are made in the name of Wendell Willkie, and that they are made in recognition of the Negro's contribution to our society. This is a very auspicious combination, indeed. May we all be inspired and guided by it!

## Program for Control and Regulation of Japanese Trade

[Released to the press March 11]

Interim plans prepared by the United States Government for the control and regulation of Japanese trade with the United States are now nearly completed. The major feature of the program is that the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, General MacArthur, will have complete operating responsibility for all imports and exports, utilizing, where appropriate, agencies of the United States Government or of the Japanese Government. The international aspects of Japanese trade control are still being studied and informal negotiations with other countries are under way.

During the interim period Japanese exports to the United States will be handled through the United States Commercial Company, a subsidiary of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, which has had experience conducting a similar operation in Italy. The War Department will continue to do most of the procuring of imports. Inquiries concerning the availability of goods from Japan are being handled in the United States by the field offices of the Department of Commerce, under an arrangement made by that Department with the United States Commercial Company.

Eventually, foreign trade with Japan will be restored to private hands, in line with accepted principles of United States commercial policy. For the present, however, direct trading relations between private traders and the Japanese are not possible. One factor preventing the resumption of private handling of foreign trade is the basic financial instability and disorganization of Japan, which render it impossible to establish a commercial rate of exchange. Tight controls over foreign trade are required in order to assure that selected Japanese exports are maximized in order to provide funds for essential imports necessary to prevent disease and unrest, that the volume of such imports is held as closely as possible to the level of exports, and that the Japanese do not evade our strict control for security reasons of their overseas assets and contacts. The damage resulting from bombing, the shortage of coal, and general uncertainty and disorganization resulting from defeat, and the prospects of destructions and removal in carrying out economic disarmament and reparations programs have so curtailed Japanese

output as to reduce the volume of goods available for export in the coming months to a small fraction of the pre-war level. By means of this close supervision, the possibility that United States funds may have to be advanced in order to provide subsistence during the initial recovery of Japan will be minimized. The shortage of such facilities as housing, transport, and food make it impossible to open Japan to foreign business representatives seeking to negotiate purchase or sale contracts; nor can Japanese be permitted to travel outside Japan and negotiate until the Allied program for repatriation of undesirable Japanese has been completed and Japanese foreign assets have been mobilized for payment of reparations and restitution claims.

It is recognized that the Allies in the war against Japan have considerable interests in Japan, both as a source for imports and as a market for exports, which will be protected so far as the needs of the occupation permit. In order that Allied nations may be consulted on the problems of allocating Japanese exports and procuring imports, the United States will shortly submit for the consideration of the Far Eastern Commission proposals for the establishment of an Inter-Allied Trade Committee. In the case of commodities in short world supply, instructions with respect to allocations will be sent through the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Supreme Commander. These instructions will be based on consultations with this Committee and with the Combined Committee responsible for world allocation of the commodity, if it is subject to international allocation.

The major prospect for volume export in 1946 is raw silk. There are now on hand approximately 40,000 bales and about 10,000 additional bales should become available each month. The destruction of mulberry trees during the war to increase acreage for food growing will limit the immediate recovery of the industry to perhaps one third of its pre-war output. Informal discussions on the distribution of raw silk exports have been held with interested countries. A division of exports roughly on the basis of the pre-war takings by the major silk-using countries has been suggested as one method of an international division of the raw silk. Various proposals are now being considered by the governments concerned. It is expected that exports of raw silk will begin at an early date.

The second export possibility is cotton textiles. Output will be limited by the loss of spindles during the war, many of which were scrapped or destroyed by bombing. It is hoped, however, that the operable spindles can be operated at capacity to assist in meeting the extremely critical world shortage in cotton textiles. The major problem is the supply of cotton. Arrangements are nearly completed for shipping cotton owned by the CCC to Japan to be paid for by the sale of Japanese textiles by the United States Commercial Company. Discussions are now in progress with Japan's other major source of raw cotton—India—concerning her possible participation in this program.

There are in addition small stockpiles of antimony, tin, and rubber in Japan, which were built up from imports during the war. All these items would be useful in speeding reconversion in the United States. There are also some tea, silk piece goods, and art goods which may be available for export.

In general it is the United States policy to encourage the reliance by Japan on exports of goods with no military or security significance to procure the foreign exchange which she must have if she is to pay for the food, fertilizer, and other essential imports required to maintain a subsistence standard of living, and if the burden on the occupation forces is not to be increased. To this end production and export of such items as silk and tea, ceramics, coarse grades of textiles, art and other handicraft articles are receiving encouragement from this Government, though of course no financial aid has been or will be provided by us in the rebuilding of Japanese facilities for producing exports.

## Removal of Requirements on Use of American Passports

[Released to the press February 26]

On February 12 the Department of State removed the requirement that American citizens must depart from the United States within 60 days after the issue of an American passport. American citizens may now depart from the United States if they are in possession of passports valid upon the date of their intended departure.

# International Understanding Through a Cultural-Relations Program

By ASSISTANT SECRETARY BRADEN

[Released to the press March 1]

The constructive influence of Columbia is not confined by any means to the national stage. On the contrary, it has long been a leader among our educational institutions in providing facilities for students from all parts of the globe. Today it has undoubtedly the largest group of foreign students of any university in the United States—I understand there are some seven hundred of them—and this in spite of the fact that its walls are bulging with returned veterans. Columbia is playing a large role in carrying out a program that will, in the long run, contribute effectively to the betterment of our international relations through the elimination of international misunderstanding: that is the program for exchanging students with other countries. The Department of State has come, of late years, to appreciate the fundamental importance of such a program and consequently to assist in every way proper and possible in carrying it out. I may add that since the initiation of the Department's own cultural-relations program, embracing the exchange of students and professors, there has usually been a representative of Columbia sitting in consultation with it in one capacity or another. This is a patriotic partnership and a bond between us.

The fact that our Government has come to assume an active interest in this intermingling of students from other nations with our own is profoundly significant. It shows that we have, perhaps belatedly, outgrown the old assumption that international relations might safely be left exclusively to the formal transactions of professional diplomats, that friendly international cooperation might be had simply by negotiation between governments, even though the populations themselves remained isolated from one another or even hostile. Such an assumption, while proper to the age of Machiavelli's *Prince*, is a dangerous anachronism in a democratic world. For governments that represent and serve peoples cannot possibly

collaborate in harmony if the peoples themselves misunderstand and mistrust one another. The prime fact for us to grasp is that international relations have today become relations between peoples rather than relations between independent monarchs. If this is a change that has unlimited possibilities for good, providing the whole basis for our hope in the future of mankind, it is also not without its dangers. To illustrate the dangers, I need only refer to the change that has taken place in the nature of warfare in modern times. Today it is whole populations that go to war against each other, not just small professional armies serving the craft of individual princes. Two centuries ago it was possible for Laurence Sterne to set forth from his home in England on his *Sentimental Journey* through France and Italy without even recalling the fact that his country was at war with France, and without letting that stand in his way when he did recall it! The English Government was at war with the French Government, not the English people with the French people.

Now, the whole reason why the Government has come to take an active interest in cultural interchange and the interchange of students may be summed up in this: that if today it is entire peoples who go to war, it is entire peoples who must go to peace. There can be no real peace on any other terms.

Charles Lamb once said: "I hate so-and-so because I do not know him." I can think of no better way to eliminate fundamental misunderstanding between peoples, and the bitter international mistrust that arises out of it and leads down the road to war, than by letting them know about each other through the medium of a free press and radio, on the one hand, and on the other by introducing them into each other's homes, letting them

Excerpts from an address delivered at the Columbia University Club in Washington on Mar. 2. Requests for complete text should be made to Division of Research and Publication, Department of State.

mingle and associate together in work and play in the pursuit of common interests, until they no longer regard each other as foreigners but as friends and colleagues. The student from Latin America who lives and works among us learns that we are human beings, with the ordinary weaknesses of all human beings, and also with some solid virtues. He learns that, while many of our ways take getting used to, our basic disposition is innately friendly and hospitable. Soon we are no longer strangers to him to be mistrusted on that score alone. Having come to know us, he will not believe, when he returns to his country, that the United States is composed of villains concocting imperialistic designs against his country. He will not believe this because he will have learned that the American people are friendly, freedom-loving, and fundamentally opposed to imperialism. He can enlighten his own countrymen on that point.

Now, if you multiply this one example by many thousands over a period of years—and it takes time—you will be well on your way to constructing the most solid possible foundation for international peace in a democratic age.

The Department of State would be derelict in its duty if it neglected the opportunity to further these beneficent interchanges, which must involve the pilgrimages of our students and professors to the universities of other countries as well as the extension of hospitality by our institutions to students and teachers from beyond our borders. But this great enterprise, on which so much ultimately depends, is not something that the Department of State undertakes alone or in which it can play a principal role. Students and professors were being exchanged through private initiative on a substantial scale long before this Government gave thought to the matter. It is still largely the task of private initiative and will continue to be. I am told that only some three percent of the foreign students now in the United States are here because this Government has made it possible for them to come. What the Government can do, and what it is doing, is to assist in carrying out this work. For one thing, it can work out agreements with other governments to promote these exchanges, such as the Convention for the Promotion of Inter-American Cultural Relations concluded at Buenos Aires in 1936. For another, it can provide funds to finance the visits of especially meritorious students where they themselves lack

the means and where private organizations can not provide them. In many other ways, the Government can and does act as a sort of catalytic agent to promote and organize and develop these exchanges, which private organizations carry out.

## U.S.-U.K. Agreement on Radio-Distance Indicators on Aircraft

[Released to the press February 25]

As a result of the Bermuda Telecommunications Conference,<sup>1</sup> conversations and demonstrations of the United States 1,000 megacycle and Canadian 200 megacycle radio-distance indicators for aircraft were held in Washington during the latter part of January and the first part of February 1946.

This program was for the purpose of arriving at the best practical course for providing this important air navigational aid to aircraft in the immediate future and of coordinating the future development and plans in this field between the United States and the British Commonwealth and Empire.

The necessity for such joint action was brought about by the accelerated research program pursued during the war and the need for providing frequencies for these distance indicators developed during this war period by Canada, the United Kingdom, and more recently by Australia. These distance indicators were all designed to operate in the 200 megacycle portion of the radio frequency spectrum which, unfortunately, made them unacceptable for unlimited use in the United States because the frequencies in this portion of the spectrum had been previously allocated to other services in the United States. While this situation did not prevent the members of the Commonwealth and Empire from using the distance indicator operating on 200 megacycles in regions where there was no conflict with present frequency allocations, it did prohibit its use in the United States, unless an interim arrangement could be arrived at or a frequency could be chosen which was mutually acceptable to the United States and the Commonwealth and Empire.

<sup>1</sup> For article on Bermuda Telecommunications Conference by Helen G. Kelly see BULLETIN of Jan. 20, 1946, p. 59.

The demonstrations of the United States 1,000-megacycle equipment at Andrews Field, Washington, proved the workability of the American equipment. However, after joint consultation between technical representatives of the United States and the Commonwealth, it was estimated that U.S. 1,000-megacycle equipment could not be made available in quantity before the summer of 1947. The Commonwealth representatives felt that the need for a distance indicator was more urgent in the Commonwealth than in the United States where other reliable means have been in operation for some time but which do not exist throughout the Commonwealth, and therefore a delay of approximately one and one-half years in order to make use of the 1,000-megacycle equipment would unnecessarily slow down the Commonwealth's civil-aviation program, particularly from the safety standpoint. This fact was recognized by the United States representatives, and it was agreed that efforts would be made to secure a 15-megacycle channel for this purpose, for a period expiring not later than January 1, 1949. During this interim period the United States and the Commonwealth will collaborate in the development of a suitable distance indicator operating on a frequency of 1,000 megacycles or higher. The exact frequency band is to be determined jointly, not later than January 1, 1947, and thereafter the governments would pursue a combined development program which would make the use of equipment operating in the same band available for operation prior to January 1, 1949.

The agreement, to be known as the "Arrangement Between the United States of America and the British Commonwealth and Empire Concerning Radio Distance Indicators"<sup>2</sup> was signed at Washington, D.C., on February 7, 1946, leaving open the exact frequency band of 15 megacycles which would be made available for this purpose but indicating that it would fall between the limits of 216 to 235 megacycles. Sir Robert Watson-Watt signed on behalf of the British Commonwealth and Empire and Cecil G. Harrison, Telecommunications Division, Department of State; Maj. Gen. Harold M. McClelland, Air Communications Officer, U. S. Army; Admiral E. E. Stone, Chief, Naval Communications; Commodore E. M. Webster, Chief, U. S. Coast Guard Communications; Mr. L. H. Simson, Civil Aeronautics Administration; and Mr. Paul D. Miles, Federal

Communications Commission, signed on behalf of the United States. Subsequently, the Interdepartment Radio Advisory Committee has made the necessary readjustments in the U. S. frequency allocations table to provide for the interim use of 216-231 megacycles for this purpose on a shared basis, the U. S. Army and Navy agreeing to make available the band 231-235 megacycles for the use of the present occupants of the 216-220 megacycle band, should interference result from the use of the distance indicator at U. S. gateways, and also the band 235-240 megacycles for use of the amateurs in lieu of the present amateur band 220-225 megacycles which will be made available for the distance indicator, for the interim period expiring 1 January 1949. On that date the frequencies involved will again be available to the present occupants.

## Visit of Dutch Editors

[Released to the press March 1]

Six prominent Dutch editors arrived here on March 1 for a six-day visit before going on to New York City to complete their seven-week tour of the United States as guests of the Department of State's Office of International Information and Cultural Affairs.

The members of the party are: H. J. Hellema, editor of the Calvinist daily *Trouw*, also representing *De Rotterdamer*, both organs of the Conservative Party; H. G. Hermans, assistant editor-in-chief and parliamentary editor of *De Maasbode*, leading Catholic newspaper, also representing the Catholic daily *De Tijd*; L. J. Kleyn, chief foreign editor of *Het Vrije Volk*, who represents the Social Democratic Press; A. J. Koejeman, editor of the leading Communist daily *De Waarheid* and member of Parliament; A. J. P. Tamms, chief foreign editor of *Nationale Rotterdamsche Courant*, liberal newspaper, also representing the Amsterdam liberal daily *Algemeen Handelsblad*; and H. M. Van Randwijk, editor of the former underground weekly magazine *Vrij Nederland*, now one of the Netherlands' foremost magazines, also representing the former underground newspaper *Het Parool*, now a leading Amsterdam daily.

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<sup>2</sup> Not printed.

## Spanish Situation

The Department of State announced on February 27 that the Secretary of State has on previous occasions indicated that we have over a period of time been exchanging views with the British Government and the French Government in regard to the situation in Spain.

In connection with these exchanges this Government has recently presented to the British and French Embassies in Washington and through them to their governments certain American views. Sufficient time has not yet elapsed during which the French and British Governments could have replied to these suggestions and for the time being, therefore, the Department of State is not in a position to disclose the nature of these views.

## U.S.-U.K. Air-Transport Agreement

### STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT

[Released to the press by the White House February 26]

I want to express my satisfaction with the conclusion of an air-transport agreement with the United Kingdom at Bermuda on February 11. It is now clear that very difficult problems in specialized technical areas in the relations of the two countries can be worked out separately from the over-all financial and trade negotiations which took place during the fall. Under the Bermuda agreement there will be no control of frequencies and no control of so-called "Fifth Freedom" rights on trunk routes operated primarily for through service. It gives to the airline operators the great opportunity of using their initiative and enterprise in developing air transportation over great areas of the world's surface.

Because civil aviation involves not only problems of transportation but security, sovereignty and national prestige problems as well, the joint working out of air transport agreements between nations is a most difficult one. Many countries, naturally desirous of having air transport companies of their own, and with treasuries heavily depleted by their war efforts, have a genuine fear of the type of rate war with which the history of

various forms of transportation has been so full. In the Bermuda agreement the Executive branch of the United States Government has concurred in a plan for the setting-up of machinery which should protect against the type of rate war feared by so many of the countries through whose air space we desire that our airlines have the right to fly. Part of the plan for future rate control will be dependent on the granting of additional powers by the Congress to the Civil Aeronautics Board.

The major purpose of the two Governments in regard to civil air transport has now been set forth in writing and it reads:

"(1) That the two Governments desire to foster and encourage the widest possible distribution of the benefits of air travel for the general good of mankind at the cheapest rates consistent with sound economic principles; and to stimulate international air travel as a means of promoting friendly understanding and good will among peoples and insuring as well the many indirect benefits of this new form of transportation to the common welfare of both countries."

I believe the results of this Conference constitute a very important forward step.

## *The Foreign Service*

### American Consulates Reopened in Germany

[Released to the press February 27]

The Secretary of State announced on February 27 that about March 1, 1946, American consulates will be opened in Germany at the following places: Berlin, Bremen, Frankfurt, Hamburg, Munich, and Stuttgart. These offices will be staffed to provide normal consular facilities including: welfare and protection work, issuance of American passports and visa facilities to persons entitled to non-quota and first and second preference under the Immigration Act of 1924. American passports

will be issued to American citizens in Germany to enable them to come to the United States. Upon the opening of the offices, publicity will be given to the procedure to be followed by American citizens desiring to come to the United States.

Concerning refugees and displaced persons resident in the American zone of occupation on December 22, 1945 the Secretary referred to the President's directive of that date<sup>1</sup> and reiterated the desire of the American Government to join with other governments to the extent permitted by law in receiving a portion of these oppressed people. He stated that the Interdepartmental Committee which has been investigating the situation in Germany has reported that the largest number of these displaced persons are located near Munich and Stuttgart and, for that reason, the consulates in those cities have been instructed to grant visas, within the quotas authorized by law, to qualified persons resident in those districts on December 22, 1945. The other consulates at Berlin, Bremen, and Frankfurt which are under American administration will consider such cases in the near future.

Full information concerning the requirements is being circulated in the various camps in Germany. Relatives or friends resident in the United States who are able and willing to give financial assistance and assurance of support to displaced persons who were resident in the American zone on December 22, 1945 should communicate with the appropriate consul through the Department of State.

A sponsor may forward an envelop containing only affidavit of support and corroborative evidence addressed either to the American Consul at Stuttgart or the American Consul at Munich, in care of the Department of State, Washington 25, D.C. The envelop should bear postage at the regular foreign rate (five cents for the first ounce; three cents for each additional ounce or fraction) and should be marked "Contains immigration support documents only". Air mail or registry service will not be provided.

Sponsors who wish to defray the cost of the visa fees, amounting to \$10 on behalf of each visa

<sup>1</sup> BULLETIN of Dec. 23, 1945, p. 983.

applicant, may send this amount under separate cover in the form of a money order or a certified check to the order of the Secretary of State with a covering letter giving the name of the alien, his address if known, and the nearest consular office. The funds so deposited will be held in a special account, and the appropriate consular officer will be notified by the Department regarding the deposit made to cover the visa fees for the alien in question.

The Department will be unable for the present to transmit through consular offices to persons in Germany any messages, letters, or funds. Arrangements for these services on behalf of American citizens will be made as soon as possible.

### Consular Offices

The American Consulate at Malmö, Sweden, was closed on February 20, 1946.

## The Congress

Authorizing Appointment of Additional Foreign-Service Officers in the Classified Grades; H. Rept. 1590, 79th Cong., To accompany H. R. 5244. 3 pp. [Favorable report.]

Amending Section 201 (G) of the Nationality Act of 1940; S. Rept. 989, 79th Cong., To accompany H. R. 388. 2 pp.

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serious damage to those channels, as well as to any other United States channels, a provision has been included in the Interim Agreement whereby the governments concerned will cooperate with a view to minimizing interference as occasion requires.

In view of these considerations and speaking on behalf of the Department of State, I can only congratulate all of you on your efforts and express the sincere hope that the agreement in this Conference may be an encouraging augury of further and sympathetic collaboration as problems in this important field of standard-band broadcasting confront us.